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The Myth of State Sovereignty
STEVEN G. GEY*
In recent years the Supreme Court has revived the concept of state sovereignty
and used this concept as the basis for fundamentally altering existing
constitutional doctrine governing relations between the federal and state
governments. The problem posed by the Court's recent federalism decisions is
that the state-sovereignty rationale used to support those decisions is much
broader than necessary to justify the limited consequences of the rulings in
which the rationale appears. Unlike earlier generations of state-sovereignty
proponents, the Justices who support the new version of state-sovereignty theory
have largely recoiled from the logical consequences of their theory. In the final
analysis, the new state-sovereignty proponents do not really believe (or at least
do not yet admit in public) that the states they have empowered are, in fact,
"sovereign."
This article considers the Court's recent state-sovereignty rulings in light of a
theoretically consistent theory of what it means to be "sovereign. "Based on this
analysis, the article concludes that the new state sovereignty is presently an
incoherent and largely mythical concept that makes it difficult for the federal
government to operate; however, in the end, this new state sovereignty does not
interfere with federal primacy. This raises a basic question: Does the absence of
a coherent rationale doom the new state sovereignty decisions to a short,
ignominious life, or are these inconsistent decisions simply preparation for a
truly radical return to real state sovereignty, in which fifty different parochial
sovereigns can control their own destinies over large swaths of public policy,
free of any coordination or control by the national government?
I. INTRODUCTION
It is now apparent that the United States is in the midst of a constitutional
revolution. For the most part, it is a quiet revolution. The issues around which the
revolution is being fought are so esoteric that anyone not possessing an
unnaturally strong interest in the structural aspects of constitutional law will have
a difficult time staying awake long enough to understand the details of what is
happening. In short, during the last ten years a narrow but steadfast five-member
majority of the Supreme Court has used a broad conception of state sovereignty to
expand the power of state government (and simultaneously to restrict the power
of the federal government) in virtually every area in which the two governments
operate.
The battle over the new theory of state sovereignty has occurred on four
fronts. First, the five states'-rights Justices have asserted the concept of state
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sovereignty as the rationale for broadening the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity from lawsuits brought by private litigants in federal court to redress
state violations of federal law. Second, these Justices have used the concept of
state sovereignty to restrict the federal government's ability to require state
officials to enforce national social and environmental policies. Third, similar
state-sovereignty concerns have motivated the majority of the Court to greatly
expand the scope of the Younger abstention doctrine and related doctrines
restricting federal court equitable authority to enforce federal law. Finally, the five
states'-rights Justices have used the concept of state sovereignty as a primary
justification for reversing a fifty-year trend of judicial deference and invalidating
several federal statutes enacted under the Commerce Clause.
As these examples indicate, the new constitutional limitations on federal
power have spread quickly to several different constitutional areas; however,
these decisions are united by the majority Justices' reliance on the concept of state
sovereignty. The concept becomes more grandiose with every passing day. In the
five-member majority's latest pronouncement on the subject, the preservation of
state sovereignty has become "a defining feature of our Nation's constitutional
blueprint.... States, upon ratification of the Constitution, did not consent to
become mere appendages of the Federal Government. Rather, they entered the
Union 'with their sovereignty intact."' '
Despite the concept's importance, both the source and the parameters of the
new state-sovereignty principles are unclear. It seems that the Court's new theory
of state sovereignty exists somewhere beyond the constitutional text. It is a
mythical concept, and it has been applied not only to cases in which the
constitutional text is silent, but also to those in which the constitutional text seems
to directly contradict the concept. The Court's recent use of the Eleventh
Amendment in Alden v. Maine2 provides one measure of how much the Court has
transformed and invigorated the concept of state sovereignty in only a decade. In
Alden, the Court interpreted the Eleventh Amendment-which by its terms
addresses only the power of federal courts-to hold that states could not be sued
in their own courts for violations of federal law. The Court granted the states
broad authority to avoid the enforcement of federal law and openly acknowledged
that this authority fell "outside the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment. ' 3
I Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1870 (2002) (quoting
Blatchford v. Native Viii. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)).
2 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
3 Id at 727. The literal text of the Eleventh Amendment reads: "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. X1.
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What the text of the Eleventh Amendment did not provide, the Court was happy
to fill in with the myth of state sovereignty.4
Of course, this has happened before. The last life-and-death battle for control
of the Court and the Constitution occurred during the 1930s over precisely the
same issues of state sovereignty and federal government power. There are
significant differences between the new and old concepts of state sovereignty,
however, which undermine much of what modem states'-rights proponents say
about the concept. The old state-sovereignty proponents had the courage of their
convictions; their concept of sovereignty truly envisioned forty-nine different
sovereigns (forty-eight states plus the federal government) with independent
sources of power and forty-nine different political constituencies. During the
heyday of the old states'-rights jurisprudence, the Court effectively insulated each
of these independent sovereigns from the political pressure imposed by
competing sovereigns. The Court's new state-sovereignty proponents, on the
other hand, do not have the same courage of their convictions and have largely
recoiled from the logical consequences of their theory. When push comes to
shove, they do not truly believe (or at least do not yet admit in public) that the
states they have empowered are, in fact, "sovereign." Their mythical state
sovereignty is therefore an empty concept, which makes it difficult for the federal
government to do its various jobs, though, in the end, it does not stand in the way
of federal primacy.
The problem this poses for the new state-sovereignty proponents is that the
various rationales they employ to support the new decisions are much broader
than are necessary to justify the limited consequences of the rulings in which
those rationales appear. These rationales may support the old-fashioned concept
of complete state sovereignty, under which states really were divorced from
federal government control and could make policy independent of the national
government, but the rationales do not support the half-hearted, inefficient, and
ultimately meaningless incomplete state sovereignty that the Court's new
majority has decided to embrace. This raises a question: Does the absence of a
coherent rationale doom the new state-sovereignty decisions to a short,
ignominious life, or are these inconsistent decisions simply preparation for a truly
radical return to real state sovereignty, in which fifty different parochial
sovereigns can control their own destinies in certain areas free of any coordination
or control by the national government?
4 This is not the first article to identify mythical elements in the Court's recent states'-
fights jurisprudence. The focus of this article is on the logic of the Court's conception of
sovereignty as applied in the Court's states'-rights decisions. For another critique of the
mythology of states' rights, which focuses on the Court's misuse of history and the practical
problems the Court's new decisions pose for the enforcement of individual rights, see Louise
Weinberg, Of Sovereignty and Union: The Legends of Alden, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1113
(2001).
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This question cannot be answered until the Court's majority decides for itself
which path it wants to take. But, it is worth reviewing the unsatisfactory situation
we find ourselves in today, as lower courts try to sort out the meaning of several
dozen recent Supreme Court decisions, all of which rest on theoretical premises
that do not support the oddly inconclusive results in the cases.
This article will review three different aspects of the constitutional protection
of state sovereignty. Part II will introduce the issues arising from disputes over
state sovereignty by reviewing the Supreme Court's application of state-
sovereignty concepts leading up to the constitutional crisis of 1933-1936. Part III
will discuss the abstract concept of sovereignty and its application in the system
of American federalism. Drawing on the work of Jean Bodin and John Austin,
this Part will describe a concept of sovereignty that is defined by three
characteristics. Under this theory, a government is properly described as
"sovereign" only if (1) that government has the exclusive power to adopt policies
in a given area, (2) the policies adopted by that government are final in the sense
that they cannot be overridden by a superior political entity, and (3) that
government has the authority to enforce those policies against all violators,
including subordinate political entities. Part IV of the article will examine the
Court's recent state-sovereignty decisions in light of this abstract conception of
sovereignty. This Part will place particular emphasis on the logical
inconsistencies of the Court's new state-sovereignty decisions. These decisions
are justified by rationales that seem to incorporate the same broad conceptions of
sovereignty described in Part III. But in the end, the modem Court has stopped
short of providing states with the power to adopt and enforce policies that are
exclusive and final in the sense that a coherent concept of sovereignty requires.
Part IV will conclude with a discussion of the implications presented by this
anomaly.
It. THE OLD STATE SOVEREIGNTY
The concept of state sovereignty was a focal point of American political
theory both before and after the Constitution was adopted. The Articles of
Confederation explicitly stated that "[e]ach state retains its sovereignty freedom
and independence," 5 and the Constitution was adopted largely in response to the
problems posed by the conflicts (especially commercial in nature) among states
generated by the Articles' broad recognition of state sovereignty. 6 The primary
5 U.S. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II.
6 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 267-68 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961):
The defect of power in the existing Confederacy to regulate the commerce between its
several members is in the number of those which have been clearly pointed out by
experience.... The necessity of a superintending authority over the reciprocal trade of
confederated States has been illustrated by other examples as well as our own.
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objective of the new constitution's antifederalist opponents was to retain for the
states as much political authority as possible.7 On the theoretical question of state
sovereignty, the antifederalist position was very clear and uncompromising: "A
fundamental conviction of nearly all Antifederalists was that the Constitution
established a national, not a federal, government, a consolidation of previously
independent states into one, a transfer of sovereignty in which the states, once
sovereign, would retain but a shadow of their former power." 8 The proponents of
strong state sovereignty have never reconciled themselves to the loss of local
political power, but the ideological orientation of those opposing strong federal
authority has in subsequent years shifted 180 degrees. At the time the Constitution
was framed, the proponents of strong state sovereignty were members of what, in
modem political parlance, would be characterized as the "progressive" branch of
the political culture.9 Since the Civil War, however, proponents of state
For a general summary of the problems during the period in which the country was governed
by the Articles, see ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLiN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 137-47 (1935) and Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63
N.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 53-54 (1988).
7 See JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION
1781-1788, at 184 (1961):
We may conclude... that if the Antifederalists had dominated the Philadelphia
Convention, the government of the nation would have continued to be a confederation of
sovereign states, and that the democratic principle of local self-government would have
been emphasized.... The states would have given Congress the power to regulate
commerce, to collect duties on imports, and to levy direct taxes in states which did not
comply with requisitions. How much farther they would have gone toward a compromise
with the Federalist position is uncertain ....
See generally STEVEN R. BOYD, THE POLITICS OF OPPOSITION: ANTIFEDERALISTS AND THE
ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONSTITUTION (1979); HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-
FEDERALISTS WERE FOR (1981).
8 MAIN, supra note 7, at 120.
9 MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE
SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1774-1781, at 239-40
(1940). Jensen concludes:
[The Articles of Confederation] were a natural outcome of the revolutionary movement
within the American colonies.... The reiteration of the idea of the supremacy of the local
legislatures, coupled with the social and psychological forces which led men to look upon
"state sovereignty" as necessary to the attainment of the goals of the internal revolution,
militated against the creation of such a centralized government as the conservative
elements in American society desired.... Today "states' rights" and "decentralization" are
the war cries of the conservative element, which is not wielding the influence in national
affairs it once did and still longs to do. But in the eighteenth century decentralization and




sovereignty have been identified largely with conservative political causes. l 0
After the Civil War, for example, issues of state sovereignty became bound up
with issues of race. This manifestation of the theory of states' rights first became
evident in local opposition to federal control of state governments during
Reconstruction,11 then mutated into support for Jim Crow legislation throughout
the South, and finally mutated again after World War II into opposition to
federally mandated integration of public schools and other facilities.
As both George Wallace-style racial and states'-rights militancy has
subsided, other causes favored by social and political conservatives have moved
in to feed local opposition to federal authority. The issues that serve as the focal
points for this opposition include federal gun control, 12 federal environmental
10 The political left never entirely abandoned the field, however. The archetypal social
progressive Justice Brandeis argued that "courageous" states should be free to serve as policy
"laboratories" in which local political actors would "remould, through experimentation, our
economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic needs." New State
Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 280-311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas
seemed to have similar sentiments in mind when he objected to the imposition of federal wage
and hour laws on state-run enterprises. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 201 (1968) (Douglas,
J., dissenting). In the area of noneconomic constitutional matters, Justice Brennan urged states
to use state constitutional protections of individual rights to correct for lax protection of federal
rights in an increasingly conservative federal court system. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of
Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986). The main distinctions between the liberal and conservative states'-
rights advocates are that the liberal versions of these arguments were not motivated by
skepticism about government in general, and were not accompanied by proposals to prevent the
federal government from addressing social problems on the national level. Since they do not
use claims of state sovereignty to hinder the exercise of sovereignty at the national level, the
liberal states'-rights proposals are not subject to the criticisms leveled at the conservative
versions below.
I 1 Even some Congressional Republicans resisted supporting legislation necessary to
protect the freed slaves on states'-rights grounds-in terms that are now reflected in modem
arguments over state sovereignty. In the debate over the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (which
among other things contained the text of what is now 42 U.S.C. § 1983):
a small but articulate group of Republicans recoiled from this latest expansion of federal
authority. Most outspoken was Lyman Trumbull, who echoed Democratic charges that the
Ku Klux Klan Act would revolutionize the federal system. The states, he insisted,
remained "the depositories of the rights of the individual"--if Congress could enact a
"general criminal code" and punish offenses like assault and murder, "what is the need of
the State governments?" Trumbull's views were seconded by Carl Schurz, who considered
the Ku Klux Klan Act unwarranted by the Constitution; privately, he characterized it as
"insane."
ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at 456
(1988).
12 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding unconstitutional the portion of
the federal Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that required local law enforcement
officials to conduct background checks of prospective gun purchasers).
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regulation,13 federal protection of abortion rights,14 federal regulation of violence
based on gender, 15 and even federally mandated speed limits. 16 Added to these
social issues are a full range of local economic interests, which tend to oppose
federal political power insofar as it subjects their entrenched parochial economic
interests to the mandate of open competition from out-of-state participants in the
national marketplace. 17
This article is not concerned primarily with the particular facts of the cases in
which state sovereignty arguments were made during the early constitutional
debates (or for that matter with the details of the more recent disputes regarding
federal control over local affairs) except insofar as those debates reflect specific
conceptions of what it means to be "sovereign." A review of the debate over state
and national sovereignty reveals that, until the Supreme Court's recent state-
13 See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U. S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S.
159, 174 (2001) (interpreting section 404(a) of the Clean Water Act narrowly to avoid
"significant constitutional and federalism questions" that would be raised by a broad
interpretation of the statute because a broad interpretation giving the federal government the
authority to regulate ponds and mudflats to protect migratory birds "would result in a significant
impingement of the States' traditional and primary power over land and water use").
14 Several Circuit Courts have rejected arguments that the federal Freedom of Access to
Clinic Entrances Act is an invalid exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause authority. See
United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 261-67 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 971
(2001); United States v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067, 1074 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Weslin,
156 F.3d 292, 296 (2d Cir. 1998); Hoffnan v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575, 582-88 (4th Cir. 1997).
15 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607-19 (2000) (holding unconstitutional
civil damages portion of federal Violence Against Women Act)
16 See Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding Nevada's challenge to
the Constitutionality of the federally mandated speed limit to be without merit).
17 The constitutional basis for restricting the influence of local economic interests is the
dormant or negative Commerce Clause doctrine, which has been a prominent feature of federal
constitutional law since Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Justice Scalia has
argued that the entire doctrine is historically and textually unjustified, and that the Court's
application of the doctrine has, "not to put too fine a point on the matter, made no sense." Tyler
Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 260-65 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas share
Justice Scalia's views on this matter and have specifically linked their opposition to the doctrine
to the need to protect state sovereignty. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of
Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610-12 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The negative Commerce
Clause has no basis in the text of the Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually
unworkable in application.... [T]he expansion effected by today's holding further undermines
the delicate balance in what we have termed 'Our Federalism."'). Justice Scalia has recently
relented in his total opposition to enforcing dormant commerce clause limitations on state
economic regulation in the limited respect that he has announced his willingness to enforce the
doctrine "in two situations: (1) against a state law that facially discriminates against interstate
commerce, and (2) against a state law that is indistinguishable from a type of law previously
held unconstitutional by this Court." Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 312 (1997)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
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sovereignty opinions, almost everyone involved in that debate shared a
conception of sovereignty that afforded to each sovereign virtually exclusive
control over matters within its designated jurisdiction. This is significant because
the precise holdings of the Court's modem decisions do not grant states the
comprehensive control over their own destinies that the Court's broad
justifications for those decisions portend. One reason for the modem Court's
hesitation to pursue the logical consequences of the new state sovereignty is the
Court's inability to fully explain away the logical and practical failures of the old
state sovereignty.
A. John Marshall's Imperfect Renunciation of State Sovereignty
In several early cases, the Supreme Court did its best to renounce the concept
of state sovereignty before it could get a footing in the new Constitution. The key
early decisions that form the core of constitutional jurisprudence relating to the
structure of govemment---decisions such as Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,18 Cohens
v. Virginia,19 Gibbons v. Ogden,20 and McCulloch v. Maryland2l1-all contain
extensive discussions rejecting state claims of sovereignty to fend off federal
legislation infringing on state policies. These discussions are phrased very broadly
and several passages seem to deny the states any status as separate sovereign
entities.22 As Chief Justice Marshall wrote in McCulloch, once the states set in
18 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
19 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
20 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
21 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
22 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 187, which observes:
[Rjeference has been made to the political situation of these states, anterior to [the
Constitution's] formation. It has been said, that they were sovereign, were completely
independent, and were connected with each other only by a league. This is true. But when
these allied sovereigns converted their league into a government, when they converted
their congress of ambassadors, deputed to deliberate on their common concerns, and to
recommend measures of general utility, into a legislature, empowered to enact laws on the
most interesting subjects, the whole character in which the states appear, underwent a
change, the extent of which must be determined by a fair consideration of the instrument
by which that change was effected.
The Gibbons Court further states:
[Tihe sovereignty of congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those
objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, is
vested in congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its
constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the
constitution of the United States.
Id. at 197. In McCulloch, the Court notes:
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motion the process that led to the adoption of the Constitution, the newly created
federal government obtained from the citizenry a sovereignty that was beyond the
states' control. 23
The Court's vigorous rejection of state-sovereignty claims against federal
action in these early cases is mitigated by the underlying assumption in each of
these decisions that the federal government possesses only limited power over a
narrow range of activities defined specifically by the powers enumerated in the
Constitution.24 Thus, while the early Court rejected all state-sovereignty claims
The assent of the states, in their sovereign capacity, is implied, in calling a [constitutional]
convention, and thus submitting that instrument to the people. But the people were at
perfect liberty to accept or reject it; and their act was final. It required not the affirmance,
and could not be negatived, by the state governments. The constitution, when thus
adopted, was of complete obligation, and bound the state sovereignties.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 404. The Martin Court asserted:
It is a mistake, that the constitution was not designed to operate upon states, in their
corporate capacities. It is crowded with provisions which restrain or annul the sovereignty
of the states, in some of the highest branches of their prerogatives. The tenth section of the
first article contains a long list of disabilities and prohibitions imposed upon the states.
Surely, when such essential portions of state sovereignty are taken away, or prohibited to
be exercised, it cannot be correctly asserted, that the constitution does not act upon the
states.... When, therefore, the states are stripped of some of the highest attributes of
sovereignty, and the same are given to the United States; when the legislatures of the states
are, in some respects, under the control of congress, and in every case are, under the
constitution, bound by the paramount authority of the United States; it is certainly difficult
to support the argument, that the appellate power over the decisions of state courts is
contrary to the genius of our institutions.
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 343-44. The Cohens Court notes:
With the ample powers confided to this supreme government, for these interesting
purposes, are connected many express and important limitations on the sovereignty of the
states, which are made for the same purposes. The powers of the Union, on the great
subjects of war, peace and commerce, and on many others, are in themselves limitations of
the sovereignty of the states; but in addition to these, the sovereignty of the States is
surrendered, in many instances, where the surrender can only operate to the benefit of the
people, and where, perhaps, no other power is conferred on congress than a conservative
power to maintain the principles established in the constitution. The maintenance of these
principles in their purity, is certainly among the great duties of the government.
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 382.
23 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 403-05.
24 See id. at 405:
This government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers. The
principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted to it, would seem too apparent, to
have required to be enforced by all those arguments, which its enlightened friends, while it
was depending before the people, found it necessary to urge; that principle is now
universally admitted.
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that were leveled against the federal government's exercise of its enumerated
powers under the new Constitution,25 the Court nevertheless assumed that these
enumerated powers defined only part-and probably a small part-of the
political universe. The states not only would continue to exist as independent
sovereigns with regard to powers not specifically granted to the federal
government, but the quantum of sovereignty retained by the states would be quite
extensive. 26 Chief Justice Marshall's offhand comment about the state-by-state
mechanism for ratifying the Constitution also describes the intellectual
atmosphere that established natural limits on the federal government's efforts to
restrict the exercise of sovereignty by the states in their own spheres of influence:
"No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines
which separate the states, and of compounding the American people into one
common mass."
27
The early Court's assumption that the states would remain free of federal-
government control over a broad range of local political policies seems at first
glance to lend credence to the modem Court's recent insistence on reinvigorating
the concept of state sovereignty. But a closer look at the early Court's concession
to state sovereignty reveals a key difference between that Court's theory and the
new theory of state sovereignty proposed by the modem Court. The difference is
that, unlike most of the modem Court's opinions, which generally provide states
only nonexclusive interests in adopting policies that may be overridden by
preemptive federal action, the early Court's discussion of the relationship between
the state and federal governments is predicated on the assumption that each
government's area of sovereignty would be exclusive and absolute. The question
in these early cases was not whether the states retained some aspects of
sovereignty over purely local affairs, but rather whether this residuum of state
sovereignty also allowed the states to avoid enforcing contrary federal policies
undertaken in pursuit of the federal government's own independent sovereign
interests. The early Court gave states this power essentially by creating two
hermetically sealed compartments of sovereignty, between which there was no
overlap.
The next Part will explain why exclusivity is a necessary attribute of any
coherent theory of sovereignty, but for present purposes it is noteworthy that the
exclusivity assumption permeates the Court's opinions in the early period of
constitutional jurisprudence. In other words, the early cases assumed that the state
and federal governments had exclusive control over their respective areas of
25 Id ("If any one proposition could command the universal assent of mankind, we might
expect it would be this-that the government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is
supreme within its sphere of action.").
26 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 203 (noting the "immense mass of legislation,
which embraces every thing within the territory of a state, not surrendered to the general
government; all which can be most advantageously exercised by the states themselves").
27 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 403.
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authority. The assumption of exclusivity was so strong that it generated a long
discussion in the Gibbons majority opinion and Justice Johnson's Gibbons
concurrence about whether the federal government's power under the Commerce
Clause was so comprehensive that states were prohibited from acting regarding
matters of "commerce" even in the absence of preemptive federal legislation. 28
The Court eventually rejected Justice Johnson's theory that the grant of
federal authority in the Commerce Clause itself prohibits the states from
regulating particular aspects of interstate commerce when the federal government
has not exercised its regulatory authority. Instead, by the end of the nineteenth
century, the Court had adopted the basic structure of dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence that still characterizes this area of constitutional law. Under this
theoretical structure of interstate commerce regulation, states may regulate aspects
of interstate commerce as long as they do not do so for the wrong reasons (i.e., to
discriminate against or burden out-of-state commerce), but the federal
government may preempt that state regulation simply by adopting a contrary
policy through federal legislation or administrative action.29 Thus, although the
Court has rejected Justice Johnson's rigid allocation of authority over commercial
regulation to the federal government, the Court continues to afford the federal
government exclusive sovereignty in the sense that if a federal statute is
legitimately enacted under the Commerce Clause, the federal statute prevails over
any and all contrary state actions. 30
28 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 209:
It has been contended by the counsel for the appellant, that, as the word "to regulate"
implies in its nature, full power over the thing to be regulated, it excludes, necessarily, the
action of all others that would perform the same operation on the same thing. That
regulation is designed for the entire result, applying to those parts which remain as they
were, as well as to those which are altered. It produces a uniform whole, which is as much
disturbed and deranged by changing what the regulating power designs to leave
untouched, as that on which it has operated. There is great force in this argument, and the
court is not satisfied that it has been refuted.
See also id at 222 (Johnson, J., concurring).
29 Congress may even exercise its authority to give states regulatory authority they would
not otherwise possess. See In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891). In Rahrer, the Court upheld the
Wilson Act, which permitted states to regulate liquor transported in its original packaging into
state territory. The Court had previously held in Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890), that state
regulations of such products in the absence of federal authorization violated the dormant
Commerce Clause. The effect of the Rahrer holding is that "Congress, if it chooses, may
exercise [its] power [to regulate commerce] indirectly by conferring upon the States an ability
to restrict the flow of interstate commerce that they would not otherwise enjoy." Lewis v. B.T.
Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27,44 (1980).
30 See, for example, the expansive interpretation of federal preemption in the Court's
recent preemption decisions. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n., 505 U.S. 88 (1992)




Although three Justices have cast doubt upon the very existence of the
dormant Commerce Clause, 31 the majority of the modem Court has not
questioned the basic structure of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence set
forth in the late nineteenth century, which gives the federal courts the formal
authority to override undesirable state regulations of interstate commerce.
Because of the Court's rulings in other areas, however, the theory of sovereignty
that underlies the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is becoming
increasingly unstable. The concept of sovereignty inherent in the modem Court's
dormant Commerce Clause opinions is inconsistent with the limitations the Court
has begun to impose on federal government sovereignty in other decisions, some
of which involve aspects of the Commerce Clause itself.32 At the very least, the
modem Court's five-person states'-rights majority has undercut federal
government power by making it difficult, if not impossible, for the federal
government to sanction states directly for violating federal dictates. 33 By
increasingly insulating the states from the effective enforcement of ostensibly
supreme federal law, the Court has constructed a system of imperfect federal
sovereignty, even while purporting to uphold the federal government's authority
ultimately to dictate how interstate commerce is regulated. 34
The modem Court's development of a new, imperfect form of federal
sovereignty is more subtle than the overt attacks on federal authority by the
Court's conservative majority during the period leading up to the constitutional
crisis of 1933-1936, even though as a practical matter the new system often
undermines the federal government's ability to govern just as effectively as the
more brazen attacks of the previous era. Subtlety has its problems, however,
because in most respects the earlier attacks on the federal government were more
logical than the modem Court's contradictory and rather surreptitious attack on
federal sovereignty. The Court's earlier attack on federal power took the form of
31 See supra note 17.
32 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (limiting the scope of Congress'
power under the Commerce Clause in order to protect state government powers to control local
affairs).
33 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (prohibiting state
employees from recovering monetary damages in federal courts from states for violations of the
federal Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000)
(prohibiting the federal government from awarding financial relief against states that have
violated individuals' rights under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706 (1999) (prohibiting state employees from enforcing their rights under the federal
Fair Labor Standards Act in state court); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (prohibiting the imposition of financial sanctions on states
for violations of federal trademark laws). The details of state-sovereignty assertions in these and
other Eleventh Amendment cases will be discussed in Part IV, infra.
34 Part IV will elaborate on the various different ways the Court's modem opinions have
undercut federal government control over areas in which it is presumptively sovereign. See
infra notes 104-275 and accompanying text.
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an explicit assertion of dual sovereignty, defined by strictly demarcated areas of
state and federal control, with little overlap between the two. Most of the
decisions that developed and applied this theory involved attacks on federal
commercial regulations, and most of the earlier Court's opinions on the subject
were framed by economic assumptions drawn from neoclassical economics.
35
The Court developed this theoretical framework at the end of the nineteenth
century, in opinions addressing the application of the first wave of comprehensive
federal economic regulatory legislation.36 For all their flaws as a blueprint for
coordinating the growth of an increasingly complex industrial economy, these
opinions exhibited a coherent and logical view of the relationship between the
federal and state governments. The Court's federalism opinions during the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries explicitly embraced the concept of dual
sovereignty-that is, the concept that the states were sovereign in certain areas
and the federal government was sovereign in others. This concept, however, had
overtones very different from those of the early Justice Marshall opinions on the
same subject. Chief Justice Marshall's opinions were clearly oriented toward
moving the political center of gravity from the parochial, squabbling state
political fiefdoms to a predominant national sovereign with ultimate control over
the country's destiny. The post-Civil War opinions had exactly the opposite goal.
Unfortunately, Chief Justice Marshall's acceptance of dual sovereignty set the
stage for the later Court's use of that concept to undermine the full
implementation of Chief Justice Marshall's nationalistic political goals. The post-
Civil War courts did not have to alter the constitutional landscape to accomplish
their objective of enshrining constitutional parochialism because even the
preeminent nationalist Chief Justice Marshall had already conceded the key
issue-i.e., that some form of state sovereignty had survived the adoption of the
Constitution.
Chief Justice Marshall himself implicitly accepted the concept of dual
sovereignty when he acknowledged that some commercial activities might be so
localized that the federal government would have no regulatory authority over
them.37 By recognizing some residue of state sovereignty, Chief Justice Marshall
35 See infra notes 38-49 and accompanying text.
36 The most important of these early opinions are Kiddv. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888), and
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), which are both discussed in the next
subpart. See infra notes 38-49 and accompanying text.
37 After insisting on a broad definition of the constitutional term "commerce," whose grant
of power to the federal government "does not stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several
States," Chief Justice Marshall then acknowledged that some laws--such as quarantine and
health laws--may have so little effect on commerce that they would relate to the internal
operations of the states, over which the federal government would have no control. Gibbons, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824). These laws, Chief Justice Marshall concluded:
form a portion of that immense mass of legislation, which embraces every thing within the
territory of a state, not surrendered to the general government; all which can be most
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made it possible for a later Court to undercut the very federal government
authority that Chief Justice Marshall so carefully cultivated. The increasingly
conservative Supreme Court in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
brought the theory of dual sovereignty into the open and expressly embraced the
concept. At that point it remained only for the Court to describe economic activity
in a way that allocated most of the significant economic regulatory decisions to
the local sovereign, thus robbing the national sovereign of any authority to
regulate much of the economic landscape.
B. The Logical Consequences of State Sovereignty
The conservative Courts of the period from approximately 1888 to 1936
implemented the theoretical framework created by Chief Justice John Marshall's
grudging acceptance of dual sovereignty by integrating into this framework the
prevailing economic theory of the time. The conservative Courts of this era
simply plugged into the constitutional structure of dual sovereignty a variety of
assumptions about economic reality drawn from the neoclassical economics that
were the received wisdom of the age.38 The economics of the era lent an
objective, scientific gloss to the Court's political manipulation of the country's
power structure. Most of the economic assumptions that form the basis of the
Court's rulings during this period can be found in the Court's Commerce Clause
rulings starting with the 1888 decision in Kidd v. Pearson,39 large portions of
which were quoted verbatim and used as the basis of the 1895 decision United
States v. E. C Knight Company,40 which established the framework that would
dictate the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause and state-sovereignty decisions
for the next forty years.
Kidd involved the state regulation of liquor production intended for shipment
out of state. The central issue was whether the production of this commercial
commodity constituted "commerce" subject to Congress' regulatory authority
under the Commerce Clause. The Court held that the state regulation did not
infringe upon Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce because the
production process was inherently a local affair and therefore subject to regulation
only by the state. Kidd embodies most of the key neoclassical economic themes
that the Court incorporated into Commerce Clause jurisprudence during the
advantageously exercised by the states themselves .... No direct general power over these
objects is granted to congress; and, consequently, they remain subject to state legislation.
Id at 203.
38 A full description of the linkage between neoclassical economic theory and the Court's
constitutional jurisprudence relating to economic regulation during this period can be found in
Steven G. Gey, The Political Economy of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& Soc. CHANGE 1 (1989-1990).
39 128 U.S. 1 (1888).
40 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
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period from 1888 to 1936. In short, four themes of neoclassical economics
appeared prominently in the Court's Commerce Clause opinions during this
period: (1) the virtually exclusive focus on microeconomic analysis; (2) the
assumption that all economic markets gravitate toward a natural equilibrium of
prices, demand, and supply; (3) the assumption that a perfect competition
paradigm applies to capitalist markets, rendering all monopolies and oligopolies
unstable and therefore short-lived; and (4) a deep opposition to all political
intervention in economic markets. 41
The first of these factors-the focus on microeconomic analysis-provides
the framework around which the Kidd Court developed the view of economic
activity that would define the universe of economic regulation and state
sovereignty for the next half-century. 42 The focal point of the Court's opinion in
Kidd was the dichotomy between manufacturing and commerce. "Manufacture is
transformation-the fashioning of raw materials into [something else]," the Court
wrote. "The functions of commerce are different."'43 It was irrelevant to the Court
during this period that problems at the manufacturing stage of an economy would
inevitably affect commerce in the thing being manufactured because the Court
insisted on viewing the production and sale of economic articles as two distinct
parts of a fragmented series of unrelated incidents. Likewise, the Court found it
difficult to understand how the federal government could not only claim authority
over the market for one product or commodity but also authority over the general
marketplace for all products and commodities. The Kidd Court expressly recoiled
at granting the federal government such extensive power over the national
economy:
If it be held that the term includes the regulation of all such manufactures as are
intended to be the subject of commercial transactions in the future, it is
impossible to deny that it would also include all productive industries that
contemplate the same thing. The result would be that Congress would be
invested, to the exclusion of the States, with the power to regulate, not only
manufactures, but also agriculture, horticulture, stock raising, domestic fisheries,
mining-in short, every branch of human industry.... The power being vested
in Congress and denied to the States, it would follow as an inevitable result that
the duty would devolve on Congress to regulate all of these delicate, multiform,
and vital interests---interests which in their nature are and must be, local in all the
details of their successful management.44
41 See Gey, supra note 38, at 26.
42 For examples of the microeconomic focus of neoclassical economic theorists, see Gey,
supra note 38, at 15-18.
43 Kidd, 128 U.S. at 20.
44 Id. at 21.
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Although the Court focused on the impracticalities of regulating all economic
activity on a national scale,45 the real fear motivating the Court's rejection of
national authority over the economy was the threat such regulation posed to the
sovereignty of the states. According to the Court, "[a] situation more paralyzing to
the state governments, and more provocative of conflicts between the general
government and the States, and less likely to have been what the framers of the
constitution intended, it would be difficult to imagine."46
As economic regulations go, the regulations at issue in Kidd were relatively
insignificant. But seven years after Kidd, the Court ruled in United States v. E. C.
Knight Company that the newly minted Sherman Antitrust Act was
unconstitutional as applied to the corporate acquisitions of the American Sugar
Company. 47 The acquisitions in question involved an attempt by American Sugar
to monopolize sugar production in the United States by taking control of five
remaining independent refineries. 48 The Knight decision added little to the joinder
of economic and political theory already seen in Kidd; indeed, much of the
analysis in Knight consisted of several pages of direct quotations fiom Kidd. The
significance of Knight was that it used the Kidd analysis to render one of the most
important pieces of federal economic legislation "a dead letter." 49 Thus, in Knight
the Court served notice that it would apply its new theory of dual sovereignty to
important as well as insignificant economic activities.
In early cases such as Kidd and Knight, the link between state sovereignty
and neoclassical localism was mostly implicit in the way the Court described
economic reality. The link between the economic and political messages of these
early cases is the theme of fragmentation; the Court insisted on seeing the country
as fragmented both politically and economically into small, largely uncoordinated
units. The syllogistic logic was largely formal and simplistic: Manufacturing (and
later mining) was inherently a local activity; inherently local activities were (as
even Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged) subject to state rather than national
authority; ergo, state sovereignty encompassed the exclusive right to regulate a
broad range of "local" economic actors and activities. The Court did not go much
45 The Kidd Court observed:
The demands of such a supervision would require, not uniform legislation generally
applicable throughout the United States, but a swarm of statutes only locally applicable
and utterly inconsistent. Any movement toward the establishment of rules of production in
this vast country, with its many different climates and opportunities, could only be at the
sacrifice of the peculiar advantages of a large part of the localities in it, if not of every one
of them.
Id. at 21-22.
4 6 1d. at22.
47 United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
48 Id. at 18 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
49 Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 230 (1948).
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beyond this simple syllogism to identify the constitutional source of state
sovereignty because it seemed so evident from the nature of the reality the Court
described.
As the Court moved toward the constitutional crisis of the nineteen-thirties,
the conservative majority began to make explicit its previously implicit
assumptions about state sovereignty. The Court described in much greater detail
the precise constitutional basis for dual sovereignty, and the Tenth Amendment
figured prominently in all these explanations. In Hammer v. Dagenhart,50 for
example, the Court directly linked what it viewed as the economic reality of
localized manufacturing activities to the political reality of independent state
sovereigns. Federal authority to regulate interstate commerce, the Court noted,
"was not intended to destroy the local power always existing and carefully
reserved to the States in the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution." 5' According
to the Court, the Tenth Amendment protection of state sovereignty covered all
traditional police powers "relating to the internal trade and affairs of the States,"52
and these "internal" affairs included all inherently localized economic activity
conducted on state soil.
Except for analogizing the regulation of the wages and hours of child workers
to inspection and quarantine laws, the Court did not elaborate on what other
activities related to "the internal trade and affairs" of the states. But after
Hammer, the list of economic activities falling into this category grew to
encompass most of the economy, and the Tenth Amendment embodiment of
state-sovereignty principles became a common justification for striking down
federal economic regulations enacted under several of Congress' Article I powers,
including the Commerce Clause,53 the Spending Clause,54 and the Taxing
Clause.55
The modem significance of these cases is not in the results themselves, but
rather in the theory of sovereignty used by the Court to arrive at the results. The
theory of state sovereignty the Court implanted in the Tenth Amendment and
used in these cases generated clear lines demarcating state and federal power. The
federal government was forbidden to enact the legislation in question because,
according to the Court, the entire subject matter of the legislation was off-limits to
the national political agencies. In striking down the Child Labor Tax, the Court
noted that "the States had never parted with" jurisdiction over the subject matter
of child labor, and concluded somewhat grandiosely that the federal statute taxing
50 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
5 1 Id at 274.
52 1d.
53 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935); Carter
v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 293 (1936).
54 See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936).
55 See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922).
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such activities threatened to "break down all constitutional limitation of the
powers of Congress and completely wipe out the sovereignty of the States." 56
Thus, the federal government could not tax economic activities at all if the tax
had a regulatory effect in an area that the Court assigned the states to control.
The Commerce Clause decisions were to the same effect. In Carter v. Carter
Coal Co.,57 the Court once again used narrow neoclassical economic concepts to
arrive at the conclusion that "the local character of mining, of manufacturing and
of crop growing is a fact, and remains a fact, whatever may be done with the
products." 58 So were the regulation of wages, working conditions, collective
bargaining, and other labor matters. 59 The evils resulting from industry-wide
labor disruptions were likewise "all local evils over which the federal government
has no legislative control."'60 After all, "wages are paid for the doing of local
work," and "[w]orking conditions are obviously local conditions." 61 Since all of
these matters were local in nature, they were purely an internal concern of the
sovereign states. "It is no longer open to question that the general government,
unlike the states, possesses no inherent power in respect of the internal affairs of
the states; and emphatically not with regard to legislation." 62
The prospect of a national strike in the coal industry-which would have had
the effect of crippling industrial production in all commercial commodities
nationwide--offered the Court the opportunity to limit the economic havoc
created by its theory of state sovereignty by creating an exigent-circumstances
exception to the states' sovereign independence. But this very argument-i.e.,
that the federal government's interest in ameliorating the depression's national
effects justified overriding the states' sovereignty-had been made by the federal
government and rejected by the Court a year before Carter Coal in Schechter
Poultry.63 The Court's first generation of state-sovereignty decisions thus
provided the states with such comprehensive authority that this authority could
not be limited even to accommodate a national emergency that threatened to
render the entire discussion of state sovereignty irrelevant.
For purposes of comparing the Court's new and old concepts of state
sovereignty, the most salient characteristic of the first generation of state-
sovereignty decisions is that these decisions all employed a theory of sovereignty
that assigned absolute authority over certain narrowly defined activities to the
56Id at 38.
57 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
58 Id. at 304.
5 9 Id.
60 Id at 308.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 295 (citation omitted).
63 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 528-29 (1935)
(rejecting the argument that a national emergency justified a federal statute).
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federal government and equally absolute authority over everything else to the
states. Federal and state sovereignty occupied two entirely separate categories,
and their coverage did not overlap-even when (as the federal government
asserted unsuccessfully in Schechter Poultry) a national emergency seemed to
demand federal intervention. The Court clearly comprehended the peculiarity of
one independent sovereign operating within the boundaries of another, but aside
from tinkering with the nomenclature of sovereignty, the Court of this period
adhered strictly to its determination that the states were, within large areas of
concern, absolutely free of the national government's control. "While the states
are not sovereign in the true sense of that term, but only quasi-sovereign, yet in
respect of all powers reserved to them they are supreme-'as independent of the
general government as that government within its sphere is independent of the
States.' 64 The states did not even have a say in the matter. "State powers can
neither be appropriated on the one hand nor abdicated on the other."65 The state's
sovereignty was protected regardless of whether the sovereign wanted the
protection or not.66
It is by now common historical understanding that this absolutist theory of
state sovereignty and its companion theory of constitutionalized laissez-faire
economics almost destroyed the Court and could have done the same thing to the
country as a whole.67 It is also commonly understood that the same Court that
steadfastly protected states from the encroachment of the elected branches of the
federal government simultaneously and paradoxically embraced other federal
64 Carter, 298 U.S. at 294 (quoting Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 124 (1870)).
6 5 Id. at 295.
66 In the Child Labor Case, the Court rejected the argument that federal legislation may
actually assist states in accomplishing social objectives by preventing a race to the bottom
among states competing for scarce economic resources. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S.
251, 273 (1918) ("Many causes may co6perate to give one State, by reason of local laws or
conditions, an economic advantage over others. The Commerce Clause was not intended to
give to Congress a general authority to equalize such conditions.").
67 The Roosevelt Court-packing plan and Justice Roberts' notorious "switch in time that
saved the Nine" are the most obvious political and judicial manifestations of the Court's
vulnerability during this period, although not everyone is willing to accept the usual
interpretation of these phenomena as gospel. See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW
DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CoNsTrTunoNAL REVOLUTION 66-83 (1998) (arguing that
the Court abandoned its laissez-faire constitutional principles in pre-1937 cases such as Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)); William Lasser, Justice Roberts and the Constitutional
Revolution of 1937-Was There a "Switch in Time"?, 78 TEx. L. REv. 1347, 1348 (2000)
(book review) (arguing that Cushman "provides a clear and important discussion of the early
and pre-New Deal cases, especially Nebbia v. New York," but "[like most revisionists ....
Cushman focuses far too intently on proving his own case [and] fails to provide either a
convincing or a complete account of the New Deal constitutional crisis").
20021 1619
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
constitutional doctrines that effectively nullified state regulatory efforts.68 It did
not seem to occur to the Court that the Tenth Amendment/state-sovereignty logic
that protected states from the regulatory efforts of Congress and the President also
should limit the Court's ability to enforce nationalist constitutional values such as
liberty and property rights against sovereign states. If, as the Court asserted in
Carter Coal, "[i]t is no longer open to question that the general government,
unlike the states, possesses no inherent power in respect of the internal affairs of
the states," 69 then all interference in the internal affairs of the states by agencies
of the federal government-including interference by the federal courts-would
seem to be prohibited.
If a sovereign government cannot act as it chooses, then that government's
sovereignty is violated. Federal judicial restrictions on state action therefore
interfere with state sovereignty just as much as federal legislation. There is little
flex in the concept that "in respect of all powers reserved to them [states] are
supreme-'as independent of the general government as that government within
its sphere is independent of the States. '"'70 The fact that in Lochner and other
cases the Court was enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, which itself contains
language limiting the powers of the states, does not resolve the dilemma created
when a court of one sovereign (the federal government) enforces limitations on
another (the states). Thus, even if the Fourteenth Amendment is read as a
limitation on state sovereignty, that limitation should be enforceable (if one takes
seriously the state-sovereignty logic adopted by the Supreme Court in the early
twentieth century) only by the courts of the forty-eight states in existence at that
time.
Of course, this system of localized enforcement would create forty-eight
different interpretations of the Constitution and would also lead inevitably to the
underenforcement (or nonenforcement) of national ideals that conflicted with the
parochial interests and idiosyncratic local values of particular areas of the country.
But respect for localized idiosyncrasies seems to be the whole point of taking
state sovereignty seriously; the primary object of the state-sovereignty enterprise
is to devolve governance from the national government to the various states. The
fact that the same Supreme Court that endorsed an absolutist brand of state
sovereignty also routinely violated that sovereignty by overturning state economic
regulations speaks volumes about the viability of the concept of state sovereignty
itself. Even the strongest proponents of political parochialism on the Supreme
Court during this period could not make state-sovereignty principles conform to
the overriding values enshrined in the Constitution and applicable throughout the
68 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 605 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("It is
most familiar history that during this same period the Court routinely invalidated state social
and economic legislation under an expansive conception of Fourteenth Amendment substantive
due process.").
69 Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 295 (citation omitted).
70 Id. at 294 (quoting Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (II Wall.) 113, 124 (1870)).
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nation. This inconsistency between national values and parochial politics, coupled
with the political and economic disaster that the system of state sovereignty had
become, led the Court to denounce and abandon absolutist notions of state
sovereignty in 193771 and effectively bury the concept of judicially enforceable
state sovereignty (via the Tenth Amendment) in 1941.72
Now, almost sixty years later, another conservative Court has breathed life
into a mutated form of state sovereignty. The nature of the mutations are the
interesting thing about the Court's new efforts because the modem Court's
opinions in this area convey the impression that even the conservative majority of
this Court seems to understand that the old manifestations of state sovereignty
have been discredited forever. Readers of the Court's recent opinions will look in
vain for proud announcements by the majority that the Court has once again
adopted the theory set forth in Carter Coal and Kidd v. Pearson.73 The question is
whether the new form of state sovereignty is really any different than its
discredited predecessor.
Before turning to the precise nature of the new version of state sovereignty, it
is necessary to consider briefly what the second word of that phrase-i.e.,
"sovereignty"--entails. This detour is necessary because in the end the Court's
description of its new version of state sovereignty is fatally flawed in one of two
ways. First, if the Court's description of the limitations of its new version of state
sovereignty is taken at face value, the theory is flawed because the authority it
grants to the states cannot accurately be described as "sovereignty." Second, if the
Court really does intend to grant the states true sovereignty, then the descriptions
of the limitations on that theory in the Court's recent cases are inaccurate if not
downright misleading. Allocation of true sovereignty to the states would entail far
more state independence from national prerogatives than the Court has yet
admitted. Under this latter view, it is difficult to see how a return to the world of
Carter Coal could be avoided.
71 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (noting Congress'
authority to regulate even intrastate effects on interstate commerce, and observing that although
Congress' power "must be considered in the light of our dual system of government... [t]he
question is necessarily one of degree").
72 See the famous passage in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), concluding that
the Court's interpretation of Congress' Commerce Clause authority "is unaffected by the Tenth
Amendment" because the Amendment "states but a truism that all is retained which has not
been surrendered." Id at 123-24; see also Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942)
(noting that "effective restraints on [the] exercise [of federal Commerce Clause authority] must
proceed from political rather than from judicial processes").
73 Justice Thomas is the exception to this statement. In United States v. Lopez, Justice
Thomas spoke approvingly of Kidd, Knight, and Carter Coal and suggested that the Court
should return to the standard set forth in those cases. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 598-601 (Thomas,
J., concurring).
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III. THE MEANING OF "SOVEREIGNTY"
The current dispute over the structure of constitutional power in the United
States is usually referred to as a battle about federalism.74 This is a
mischaracterization; the battle is actually about state sovereignty, not federalism.
Despite that they are often used as interchangeable descriptions of the same legal
phenomenon, the terms federalism and state sovereignty are not identical. The
key differences between the two terms relate to conclusions about ultimate
control over policy. Specifically, it is possible to have a political system defined
by federalism without conceding the existence of state sovereignty. In such a
system, states would exist as separate political entities and would play a
significant role in the daily interactions of citizens and government, but the states'
powers would be constantly subject to reallocation by the central government as
an exercise of its sovereignty over subordinate political bodies located within its
territory. Local control over many policy decisions would continue to be a
dominant feature of such a system, but local control would always be subject to
the overriding needs of the nation as a whole.
A system such as this can be described as "flexible federalism." It is a
federalist system because it incorporates local governments within the larger
political structure, but it is "flexible" in the sense that the allocation of power
between national and local governments can be easily and quickly reconfigured to
take account of the nation's immediate needs, the changing nature of social
problems, and the relative effectiveness of local and national political entities.
State authority under a flexible federalist system is defined by political
pragmatism rather than legal formalism; there is no way to formally demarcate in
advance the respective powers of the state and national governments because
those powers are redefined constantly by the evolution of power within the
system. Likewise, within a system of flexible federalism there can be no such
thing as state sovereignty because ultimate control over the allocation of power
between the national and state governments rests with the national government. In
a flexible federalist system the national government is the only true "sovereign."
Nevertheless, such a system remains legitimately "federalist" because as a
practical matter the elected officials who control the national government will
have neither the resources at their disposal nor the political incentive to dictate
policies with regard to matters that truly have only local impact and importance.
In contrast to flexible federalism, a system characterized by what may be
termed "rigid federalism" rests on a very different mode of determining political
power, which in turn is defined by a very different concept of sovereignty. The
term "rigid" is appropriate because this form of federalism is based on an
external, abstract, and presumptively quasi-permanent distribution of power
74 See, for example, a recent symposium by the Rutgers Law Journal, Federalism After
Alden, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 631 (2000).
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between the national and local governments. Rigid federalism is characterized by
the identification of particular subject areas over which each level of government
is responsible and therefore "sovereign." The pre-1937 Supreme Court's
allocation to states of sovereign power to regulate "local" economic activities is
an example of rigid federalism. The allocation of power to states during this
period was external to the political system in the sense that the allocation of
political authority was made by the Supreme Court-an institution that was
divorced from immediate political pressure and operated as an independent,
outside arbiter of the relations between two levels of government that each
claimed sovereignty over particular regulatory activities. During this period the
Court decided cases involving federalism issues based on an abstract assessment
of each political entity's formal allocation of power, without deferring to the
judgments of the political branches of government and without engaging in a real-
world critique of how the Court's formal allocation of power would affect the
ability of any governmental body to carry out effectively the policies in question.
And because the allocation of power was made in the language of constitutional
law, the decisions were quasi-permanent in the sense that the Court's allocation of
authority could be overridden only by fundamentally altering the nature of the
political structure in a manner that would in effect inaugurate a completely new
system of government.
The point of contrasting these two types of federalism is simply to highlight
the fact that the real debate over the relationship between the national and state
governments involves the issue of sovereignty, not federalism. That is, the debate
concerns the location of ultimate authority over policy, not the existence and
usefulness of local government per se. If the Court were to decide tomorrow to
renounce all its state-sovereignty rulings of the last decade, it would not change
the fact that the United States is-and will continue to be-a federalist system
characterized by vigorous state and local governments, which will continue to
exert extensive influence over a wide range of policies affecting citizens within
their boundaries.
The concepts of federalism and state sovereignty have become confused
because the modem champions of states' rights on the Supreme Court themselves
often seem confused about which concept they are advocating. This confusion
sometimes deteriorates into outright incoherence. In Justice O'Connor's Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority75 opinion interpreting states' rights
and the Tenth Amendment, she argues that "[t]he true 'essence' of federalism is
that the States as States have legitimate interests which the National Government
is bound to respect even though its laws are supreme."76 But if the national
government's "laws are supreme," then by definition that government is not
"bound to respect" state interests that contravene those laws. Justice O'Connor
75 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
76 Id. at 581 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
16232002]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
starts out the sentence discussing federalism and ends up expressing an opinion
(and an inconsistent opinion at that) on state sovereignty. 77
Justice Powell's dissent in the same case also tries to have it both ways. On
the surface Justice Powell's dissent proposes merely a weak, flexible, and
undefined federalism, which ostensibly would never allow the parochial interests
of states to override a superior national concern. Justice Powell proposes a
federalism that would "explicitly [weigh] the seriousness of the problem
addressed by the federal legislation at issue in that case, against the effects of
compliance on state sovereignty." 78 But the very notion that the concept of state
sovereignty could ever outweigh the federal government's assertion of a strong
national interest decides the key issue in favor of the states and undermines the
flexibility that is supposedly built into the balancing test that Justice Powell
proposes. Characterizing the matter in terms of a balancing test merely allows
Justice Powell to avoid the difficulties inherent in then-Justice Rehnquist's earlier
National League of Cities majority opinion, 79 which attempted to define the
boundaries of state sovereignty, but failed to do so in a way that could be applied
consistently in the modem world.80 Justice Powell's attempt to salvage the issue
of state sovereignty by incorporating it into an open-ended balancing test merely
produces a doubly unsatisfactory decision: it does not provide states the absolute
sovereignty that they seek to avoid expensive federal mandates, but it also does
not give the federal government the unquestioned authority to pursue the national
interest as defined by Congress and the President. The federal government is
sovereign, Justice Powell asserts, except when it is not.
77 The Justices' confusion over issues of federalism and sovereignty are complicated
further by the fact that they do not even use the terms consistently. For one effort to distinguish
and quantify the various different ways in which the Court has used the term "state
sovereignty," see H. Jefferson Powell & Benjamin J. Priester, Convenient Shorthand: The
Supreme Court and the Language of State Sovereignty, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 645 (2000). The
authors conclude that "[d]espite the centrality of federalism to the American political landscape,
the Court has never provided a precise definition of 'state sovereignty.' In fact, the Court has
failed even to use the idea or language of 'state sovereignty' in a consistent way in its opinions."
Id. at 647.
78 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 562 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell's dissent in Garcia
disingenuously attributes this balancing analysis to the majority opinion in National League of
Cities. Id at 562 ("National League of Cities adopted a familiar type of balancing test for
determining whether Commerce Clause enactments transgress constitutional limitations
imposed by the federal nature of our system of government."). In fact, the concept of a
balancing test is not even mentioned in the National League of Cities majority opinion; rather, it
appears only in the brief concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun, who would later write the
Garcia opinion overturning National League of Cities. See infra notes 127-37 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Powell's version of the balancing test in his
Garcia dissent.
79 See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
80 The definitional problems in NationalLeague of Cities-style state-sovereignty standards
are discussed infra at notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
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In the end, the only clear part of Justice Powell's Garcia opinion is his raw
assertion that some undefined aspect of state sovereignty is so important in the
constitutional scheme that it will often override the federal government's assertion
of a compelling national interest. This is consistent with the explicit message of
then-Justice Rehnquist's National League of Cities opinion holding that
traditional governmental functions are immune from federal government control.
This theme of Justice Powell's Garcia and then-Justice Rehnquist's National
League of Cities opinions will be dealt with in more detail in Part IV. But for
present purposes, the key point is that both Justice Powell and then-Justice
Rehnquist seem to believe that states would cease to exist as meaningful political
units in the absence of some mechanism for immunizing states from the
application of federal wage and hour laws. 81 In other words, sovereignty is the
key to both opinions, not federalism.
The differences between arguments based on state sovereignty and arguments
based on federalism are important because they are the basis of the central logical
flaws in the Court's modem attempt to revive the constitutional protection of
states' rights. As these brief examples from Justices O'Connor and Powell
indicate, the logic employed by the states'-rights advocates on the Court
inevitably leads them to support the concept of state sovereignty as the basis for
some form of rigid federalism. In their clearer moments, the Justices' own
statements acknowledge this. As Justice O'Connor states this point, "[t]he central
issue of federalism, of course, is whether any realm is left open to the States by
the Constitution-whether any area remains in which a State may act free of
federal interference." 82 In other words, are states truly sovereign? The logical
flaw in this conception is that the states'-rights proponents on the Court have not
thought seriously about the meaning of the term "sovereignty," and as a result
they produce opinions that purport to embrace state sovereignty, but in the end do
not really create sovereign "area[s] ... in which a State may act free of federal
interference." 83 If the real debate is over whether states are sovereign, it is,
therefore, essential to clarify what the term "sovereign" means.
It is my contention that the term "sovereign" implies a much more
comprehensive range of authority than the states'-rights proponents on the
modem Court have yet acknowledged. This fact has not always escaped the
proponents of state sovereignty; indeed, comprehensive and absolute state
sovereignty over certain matters is precisely the system the Court endorsed during
the first period of rigid federalism, which ended in 1937.84 The difference
81 Both National League of Cities and Garcia involved the application of the federal Fair
Labor Standards Act to state and local governments.
82 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580-81 (1985) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
83 Id. at 581.
84 See supra notes 38-73 and accompanying text.
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between the earlier period of strong federalism sentiments on the Court and our
own era is that the modem states'-rights advocates on the Court have not yet
mustered the courage to hold that states are absolutely sovereign in certain areas
and likewise have not yet acknowledged the consequences of such a holding.
Deciding that the states possess absolute sovereignty over certain activities
would necessarily entail the imposition of inflexible restrictions on the federal
government's interference with the states' sovereignty-restrictions that logically
should apply to all branches of the federal government, including the Court
itself.85 So far, instead of acknowledging the far-reaching consequences of
allocating to states a measure of true sovereignty, the modem Court has chosen
instead to finesse the issue by granting states partial immunity from federal
government regulation and control (in ways that will be described in Part IV).
Unfortunately, the Court has justified these conclusions with theoretical
arguments that make sense only in the context of an absolute grant of sovereignty.
This disjunction between the Court's limited states'-rights holdings and its
expansive justifications for those holdings is the root of the logical flaws that
plague the Court's current approach. Part IV will describe the various ways the
Court hedges its state sovereignty bets. 86 The remainder of this Part explains why
such half-hearted efforts are at odds with the entire concept of "sovereignty."
A. Sovereignty as the Source ofAll Political Authority: The Concept of
"Ultimate Sovereignty"
The comprehensive nature of sovereignty as it relates to debates over the
distribution of power between the state and federal governments can be described
fairly easily once it is understood that the term "sovereignty" can be used to refer
to two very different concepts. One of these concepts is relevant to state/federal
power issues, and the other concept is not. Much of the theoretical literature on
the subject of sovereignty deals with the source of authority for all governmental
entities. In one sense this concept of sovereignty is the most important because
without this type of sovereignty no government legitimately could exercise
coercive authority over its citizens. I will refer to this variation on the concept of
sovereignty as the question of "ultimate sovereignty." In this context
85 The only exception to this statement is the Court's abortive attempt to carve out of the
Tenth Amendment an area of state sovereignty covering traditional governmental functions. See
Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). This attempt ended in failure nine years
later when Justice Blackmun changed sides on the issue and wrote the new majority's opinion
renouncing the earlier rule and formally overruling National League of Cities. See Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Both decisions will be discussed in Part IV,
infra. A discussion of the Court's recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence, which may provide
another mechanism for granting absolute state sovereignty over local activities having only
tangential effects on interstate commerce, can be found in Part IV.B.4, infra.
86 See infra notes 104-275 and accompanying text.
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"sovereignty" refers to the ultimate source of political legitimacy and legal
authority exercised by all governments at every level of the political structure. In
the modem era, the concept of ultimate sovereignty relates to the fact that (in
Jefferson's formulation) "[g]overnments... [derive] their just powers from the
consent of the governed. '87 The basic notion is that no government is truly
"sovereign" in the ultimate sense because all governments must obtain their
authority from those who consent to the exercise of that authority over them. The
use of popular consent to justify the ultimate sovereignty of political bodies can
take the form of everything from Hobbes' theory of citizen self-protection
through consent to sovereign power88 and Locke's notion of tacit contractarian
consent to democratic sovereignty, 89 to Rousseau's utopian concept of the general
will realized through popular participation in an all-encompassing sovereign
power.90 Theories of popular consent often generate a totalitarian circular logic
according to which citizens "consent" to their own subjugation by the
sovereign, 91 but theories of popular consent at least aspire to serve as limitations
on the exercise of absolute authority by those who populate the government and
use its agencies to pursue their own ideological goals.
The question of ultimate sovereignty is an interesting backdrop for the
present discussion of American federalism, but it has played only a tangential role
in the Supreme Court's discussions of the state sovereignty. The primary instance
in which this aspect of sovereignty has been relevant to the issue of states' rights
is in early discussions of the source of the federal government's authority. These
discussions culminated in Chief Justice Marshall's pronouncement in McCulloch
v. Maryland that the people, having what I have referred to as "ultimate
sovereignty" over government of all sorts, always retain the authority to reallocate
87 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
88 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 116 (Everyman ed., E.P. Dutton & Co. 1973) (1651).
("The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign is understood to last as long, and no longer, than
the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them.").
89 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 54 (Lester DeKoster ed.,
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publ'g Co. 1978) (1690) (discussing tacit popular consent to the exercise of
sovereign power).
9 0 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 15 (G.D.H. Cole trans., Dutton
1950) (1762) ("Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme
direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an
indivisible part of the whole.").
91 These circularities appear most explicitly in the work of Hobbes:
For it has been already shewn, that nothing the Soveraign Representative can doe to a
Subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called Injustice, or Injury; because every
Subject is Author of every act the Soveraign doth; so that he never wanteth Right to any
thing, otherwise, than as he himself is the Subject of God, and bound thereby to observe
the laws of Nature.
HOBBES, supra note 88, at 112.
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what I will refer to here as "immediate sovereignty" from one level of
government (i.e., the states under the Articles of Confederation) to another (i.e.,
the federal government under the new Constitution). 92
The arguments about ultimate sovereignty to which Chief Justice Marshall
felt the need to respond are no longer relevant to modem debates over state versus
federal sovereignty. Not even the most avid states'-rights proponents argue today
that the federal government has only the authority granted to it by the states. In
any event, even if such arguments were still made, they would not resolve the
debate over the precise contours of modem state sovereignty. Assertions about
ultimate sovereignty do not help to resolve the relevant modem disputes over
states' rights because the assertion that "the people" are the ultimate repository of
sovereignty can logically be employed on behalf of either state or federal
sovereignty. Debates about the nature and configuration of federalism are really
arguments about the distribution of governmental power, not its source, and
however these debates are resolved, the victor will logically claim "the people" as
the ultimate source of its sovereignty.
92 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), which states:
The powers of the general government, it has been said, are delegated by the states, who
alone are truly sovereign; and must be exercised in subordination to the states, who alone
possess supreme dominion. It would be difficult to sustain this proposition. The
convention which framed the constitution was indeed elected by the state legislatures. But
the instrument, when it came from their hands, was a mere proposal, without obligation, or
pretensions to it.... [B]y the convention, by congress, and by the state legislatures, the
instrument was submitted to the people. They acted upon it in the only manner in which
they can act safely, effectively and wisely, on such a subject, by assembling in
convention....
From these conventions, the constitution derives its whole authority. The government
proceeds directly from the people; is "ordained and established," in the name of the
people .... The assent of the states, in their sovereign capacity, is implied, in calling a
convention, and thus submitting that instrument to the people. But the people were at
perfect liberty to accept or reject it; and their act was final. It required not the affirmance,
and could not be negatived, by the state governments. The constitution, when thus
adopted, was of complete obligation, and bound the State sovereignties.
It has been said, that the people had already surrendered all their powers to the state
sovereignties, and had nothing more to give. But, surely, the question whether they may
resume and modify the powers granted to government, does not remain to be settled in this
country ... when, "in order to form a more perfect union," it was deemed necessary to
change this alliance into an effective government, possessing great and sovereign powers,
and acting directly on the people, the necessity of referring it to the people, and of deriving
its powers directly from them, was felt and acknowledged by all. The government of the
Union, then, (whatever may be the influence of this fact on the case), is, emphatically, and
truly, a government of the people. In form and in substance it emanates from them. Its
powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit.
Id. at 402-05.
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B. Sovereignty as the Allocation of Governmental Power: The Concept of
"Immediate Sovereignty"
For purposes of assessing the Supreme Court's recent states'-rights decisions,
the more important aspect of the theory of sovereignty is not the concept of
ultimate sovereignty, but rather the more mundane concept of what I will call
immediate sovereignty. Ultimate sovereignty asks how and fiom what source a
government receives its authority. Immediate sovereignty focuses on the political
and legal characteristics of that government's authority.93 In other words, what
sorts of authority must be granted to a particular government entity to justify
characterizing that entity as "sovereign"? Phrasing the matter in yet another way:
What characteristics are inherent in the exercise of sovereignty by a government?
In governmental systems that do not incorporate federalist political structures, the
question of immediate sovereignty is insignificant because only one national
government exists, and by definition that government possesses all the immediate
power granted by the system to make and implement policy.94 In a federalist
political system, however, the immediate sovereignty issue is extremely
significant because issues of immediate sovereignty have to be settled before the
citizens can know which legal directives from which level of government they are
obligated to obey.
If, as the first theorist of modern sovereignty Jean Bodin once wrote, "the law
is nothing but the command of a sovereign making use of his power, '95 then an
observer must be able to identify the sovereign to know whether a particular law
93 Thus, the question of immediate sovereignty will only arise after the question of
ultimate sovereignty has been settled. The concept of immediate sovereignty assumes that
ultimate sovereignty has been granted to some government entity. In other words, in a
democratic political system the question of immediate sovereignty arises only after "the people"
have in some formal way communicated their consent to the exercise of power by some
governmental entity.
94 This is not to say that the government in a non-federalist democratic system is
unconstrained in its exercise of power. It is logically consistent to insist that even though a
particular sovereign is unitary, it must still conform its behavior to what H.L.A. Hart called
"rules of recognition" in order to legitimize its exercise of authority. See H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 92-96 (1961). "Rules of recognition" are the overreaching rules that structure
the operations of the sovereign and certify its actions as legitimate.
[W]hile primary rules are concerned with the actions that individuals must or must not do,
these secondary rules [of recognition] are all concerned with the primary rules themselves.
They specify the ways in which the primary rules may be conclusively ascertained,
introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively determined.
Id. at 92. A constitution is one example of a "rule of recognition," such that the sovereign's laws
are invalid if they are enacted outside the structure of lawmaking defined by the constitution or
in violation of specific constitutional prohibitions.
95 JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY: FOUR CHAPTERS FROM THE Six BOOKS OF THE
COMMONWEALTH 38 (Julian H. Franklin trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1992) (1576).
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is valid. At least in this narrow sense, the concept of immediate sovereignty
follows John Austin's axiom that law is simply the "command of a monarch or
sovereign number in the character of political superior," 96 with the term
"superior" signifying nothing more than "the power of affecting others with evil
or pain, and of forcing them, through fear of that evil, to fashion their conduct to
one's wishes." 97 Alexander Hamilton made the same point in enumerating the
problems with decentralized sovereignty under the Articles of Confederation:
Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea of
a law that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or
punishment for disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the
resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws will, in fact, amount to
nothing more than advice or recommendation. 98
96 JOHN AUSTIN, PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 121 (1861).
97 Id. at 15. 1 emphasize that I am using Austin's obedience postulate here only in the
narrow sense that it is necessary in distinguishing between competing claims of sovereignty. I
do not mean to imply agreement with the broader interpretations of Austin's linkage of
sovereignty and obedience, which taken to the extreme would conclude that the power of a
sovereign government is by nature not subject to legal limitations. In any event, these broader
interpretations of Austin's theories probably go beyond what Austin himself intended. Julius
Stone has argued, for example, that Austin was not describing unlimited sovereignty as a
concrete political fact; Austin's claims were "rather an assertion that such logical coherence as
the propositions of a legal order may have is likely to be most easily and most fully seen if we
arrange them as ifthey were commands of such a sovereign.... [T]he Austinian sovereign is a
formal postulate." JULIUS STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS 73 (1964).
Whether Austin believed that the sovereign is, as an empirical political fact, not subject to
limitation by (for example) the provisions of a written constitution, is irrelevant to the issue
addressed in the text, which simply attempts to assess whether the policy determinations of one
political entity (a state government) are subject to limitations by a superior political entity (the
federal government).
98 THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 110 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).
Hamilton goes on to note the problems that arise when multiple sovereigns have to compete for
domination in having their commands obeyed:
This penalty, whatever it may be, can only be inflicted in two ways: by the agency of the
courts and ministers ofjustice, or by military force; by the COERCION of the magistracy,
or by the COERCION of arms. The first kind can evidently apply only to men; the last
kind must of necessity be employed against bodies politic, or communities, or States. It is
evident that there is no process of a court by which the observance of the laws can in the
last resort be enforced. Sentences may be denounced against them for violations of their
duty; but these sentences can only be carried into execution by the sword. In an association
where the general authority is confined to the collective bodies of the communities that
compose it, every breach of the laws must involve a state of war; and military execution
must become the only instrument of civil obedience. Such a state of things can certainly
not deserve the name of government, nor would any prudent man choose to commit his
happiness to it.
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Several characteristics of immediate sovereignty follow from the conclusion
that immediate sovereignty is defined primarily by the sovereign's ability to issue
commands and have them obeyed. Three such characteristics are especially
important in analyzing the Supreme Court's recent states'-rights jurisprudence:
exclusivity, finality, and enforceability. Accordingly, a government entity can
only be deemed "sovereign" (in the sense of immediate, rather than ultimate
sovereignty) if that government's power to adopt policies in a given area is
exclusive, if those policies are final, and if the government has the authority to
enforce the policies (in Austin's phrase) "with evil or pain [or] through fear of that
evil." 99 A sovereign government's power must be exclusive because if some
other entity has the power to enact and enforce policies that contradict the
government's policies, then the government is not a "political superior"' 00 and
therefore is not truly sovereign in the sense described above. For the same reason,
a sovereign government's policies must be final because if some other entity can
revise or override a government's policies the government is not superior in the
sense required by the theory of immediate sovereignty.' 0' Finally, a sovereign
government's policies must be enforceable against inferior entities that violate
those policies because if the policies are not enforceable the government cannot
truly force the inferior entities to "fashion their conduct to [the government's]
wishes"'102 in the sense necessary to satisfy the definition of immediate
sovereignty.
This definition of sovereignty may at first seem unduly inflexible and
unrealistic because it denies that sovereign power may be shared by two levels of
government in a federal system. In fact, this rigid definition is mandated by the
simple political reality that the exercise of immediate sovereignty is a zero-sum
game: if one governmental entity has sovereignty, then by definition the other
does not. Attempts to recognize two supposedly equal sovereigns governing the
same subjects in the same territory will inevitably fail. Whenever the policies of
two different governments conflict, one government must concede power to avoid
interminable governmental stasis or, if all else fails, civil war. Stasis is likely to
Id. Hobbes phrases the same point more bluntly: "[C]ommand of the militia, without other
Institution, make him that hath it Sovereign." HOBBES, supra note 88, at 94.
99 AUSTIN, supra note 96, at 15.
100 Id. at 121.
101 The fact that the federal courts in the American constitutional system can invalidate
federal legislation that does not conform to the Constitution does not mean the federal
government is not sovereign. The theory of immediate sovereignty described in the text looks
only to relationships between different levels of government, not to relationships between
different branches of the same level of government or to questions of ultimate sovereignty that
relate to constitutional limitations on all government. Therefore, the question of immediate
sovereignty is whether a valid federal policy can be imposed on state governments, not whether
one branch of the federal government can override the actions of another branch.
102 AUSTIN, supra note 96, at 15.
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result if the subject that causes the conflict is not sufficiently important to justify
pushing the conflict to the point of a constitutional crisis. But policy conflicts over
matters of primary importance to both governments can be resolved only through
the ultimate subjugation of one government to the other. This can occur either
through a peaceful renunciation of sovereignty by one government or the use of
force (usually political, but occasionally military, in nature) by one government to
impose its authority on the other.
It is possible to have two sovereigns that govern different subjects operating
in the same physical territory without incurring the inevitable competition for
supremacy, but in that situation the theoretical problems of dual sovereignty give
way to the insuperable pragmatic problems of categorization and definition. Any
attempt to subdivide a territory's governance of different subjects between two
separate sovereign entities requires a clear, easily identifiable line between the
respective governments' areas of sovereign authority. If the line is less than clear,
the two governments will sooner or later compete for dominance in the zone of
ambiguous authority. In the meantime, citizens of both governments will be
confronted with contradictory legal directives from the two sovereigns. In a
worst-case scenario, the two governments will resort to the use of increasingly
coercive means of asserting their dominance. This battle will surely escalate as
the stakes of losing the competition for political primacy increase, to the point that
effective governance at either the national or local level becomes impossible. 103
None of what has been said in this Part necessarily favors either a strong
national government or a decentralized political system defined by strong local
governments. The assertion here is simply that a coherent political system cannot
have both a strong national government and strong state and local governments
with coextensive jurisdiction over similar policy areas. Sovereignty is a mutually
103 This problem cannot be resolved by allocating to the courts the authority to identify the
relative areas of state and national sovereignty because the abstract and formalistic mechanisms
of judicial decision making are probably inadequate to the task of segregating into isolated
compartments the various aspects of modem life over which state and national governments
dictate policy. The one modem judicial effort to identify systematically matters falling within
the control of sovereign states ended in confusion and failure. The judicial descriptions of state
sovereign control simply did not work in the real world, and the Court quickly recognized that
fact and gave up the effort. See infra notes 105-37 and accompanying text. Moreover, as a
conceptual matter the very act of allocating to federal courts the role of identifying policy
matters controlled by sovereign states undermines the theoretical basis for the action because
the states thereby concede that the federal courts (which are part of the federal government)
have the (presumably sovereign) authority to make the decision in the first place. By seeking
judicial relief, the states implicitly concede that an agent of the federal government has the
sovereign authority to allocate political power to the states. By recognizing the authority of the
federal courts to make decisions concerning the political authority of the states, the states
implicitly concede that what they are seeking is not true sovereignty, but rather the sovereign's
voluntary (and impermanent) allocation to themselves of some portion of the sovereign's
power. True sovereigns take power; they do not plead for it.
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exclusive concept: if one government has it, then the other does not. In the first
period of strong states'-rights jurisprudence, the Supreme Court seemed to
understand this and allocated state and federal authority accordingly. But in the
recent resurgence of states'-rights sentiments on the Court, things are much more
ambiguous. The question, therefore, is whether any or all of the Court's recent
state-sovereignty decisions are based on a coherent understanding of the term
"sovereignty." The overwhelming weight of the evidence is that they are not. The
next Part elaborates on this conclusion.
IV. THE LOGICAL LIMITS OF THE NEW STATE SOVEREIGNTY
Perhaps the best way of illustrating how the necessary components of
sovereignty1" 4 operate in practice is to analyze the Supreme Court's recent
attempts to revive the concept of state sovereignty in various constitutional
contexts. The Court's recent ativity in this area has unintentionally provided an
excellent illustration of the concept of sovereignty outlined in the previous Part,
while simultaneously demonstrating why this concept is logically and practically
inapplicable to the states. Nevertheless, the Court persists in citing state
sovereignty as a justification for overturning or effectively nullifying an
increasing number of federal laws that were intended to apply to states.
The next three subparts trace the trajectory of the Court's recent state-
sovereignty decisions. Subpart A describes the Court's short-lived attempt in the
modem era to provide the states with true-i.e., exclusive, final, and
enforceable-sovereignty. Subpart B reviews the various justifications for state
sovereignty, all of which are consistent with the basic components of sovereignty
outlined in the previous Part. Finally, subpart C describes the Court's
unsuccessful efforts to preserve the concept of state sovereignty while avoiding
the negative consequences true state sovereignty would inevitably entail. Subpart
C also addresses the real issue raised by these new cases: Will the Court
eventually be forced to abandon the mythical, partial "sovereignty" described in
its most recent cases, or are those cases merely forerunners of yet another attempt
to ascribe to the states true sovereignty: i.e., sovereign authority that is exclusive,
final, and enforceable against everyone-including the federal government?
A. National League of Cities and the Short-Lived Revival of
Unadulterated State Sovereignty
The best starting point from which to consider the Court's modem state-
sovereignty opinions is the short-lived effort to use the Tenth Amendment as the
basis for granting states absolute sovereignty over policies falling within the
104 Unless otherwise noted, all references to sovereignty in this Part will refer to the
concept of immediate, rather than ultimate, sovereignty.
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category of "traditional" state functions. As noted in Part 1I, the Court used the
Tenth Amendment as the constitutional repository for absolutist state-sovereignty
concepts in its pre-1937 states'-rights decisions, and in National League of Cities
v. Usery, 10 5 the modem conservatives tried to update Tenth Amendment doctrine
to fit modem circumstances. The effort did not last even a decade, and the Court's
renunciation of National League of Cities in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority0 6 forced the states'-rights proponents on the Court to take a
new and logically more dubious tack of granting the states a range of partial
protections from federal control through a more limited interpretation of the Tenth
Amendment, 107 a revitalization of the Eleventh Amendment, 108 and the invention
of a variety of other implicit state-sovereignty doctrines. 109 In these post-National
League of Cities cases, the Court also premised its holdings on the need to protect
state sovereignty, but (unlike its decision in National League) conceded that the
federal government had ultimate control over the policies in question.
Unfortunately, this concession undermined whatever theoretical consistency that
justified the rules protecting the states in the first place.
In contrast to its later efforts, at least in National League of Cities, the Court
was consistent and forthright about its goals and the manner of achieving those
goals. National League of Cities was the second in a line of three cases that raised
almost exactly the same issues in almost exactly the same contexts.110 The
narrow legal issue in all these cases was whether the federal Fair Labor Standards
Act rules regarding hours and wages (including overtime pay requirements) could
be applied to state and local government employers. In National League of Cities,
the Court held that the federal statute could not be applied to those aspects of state
employment that fell within the "integral governmental functions of [those]
bodies."' I Il Application of maximum hour and minimum wage laws to state
employees, the Court held, would "significantly alter or displace the States'
abilities to structure employer-employee relationships in such areas as fire
prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and
recreation." 12
Despite its stark departure from the perceived status quo regarding relations
between the state and federal governments, the precise contours and rationale of
105 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
106 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985).
107 See infra notes 138-78 and accompanying text.
108 See infra notes 179-212 and accompanying text.
109 See infra notes 213-51 and accompanying text.
110 The first case was Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), which National League of
Cities overruled. See Nat' League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854. The third case was Garcia, which
in turn overruled National League of Cities and returned to the rule in Wirtz. See Garcia, 469
U.S. at 557.
111 Nat' League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851.
112 Id
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the National League of Cities majority opinion were mysterious. It was a mystery,
for example, why the Court felt that states would cease to exist if they had to pay
their garbage collectors overtime, yet this was the Court's grandiose conclusion.
"If Congress may withdraw from the States the authority to make those
fundamental employment decisions upon which their systems for performance of
these functions must rest, we think there would be little left of the States'
'separate and independent existence."'"11 3 It was also a mystery where, precisely,
in the Constitution the Court discovered this new rule of state sovereign immunity
from the operation of general federal statutes. The Tenth Amendment' 14 was the
obvious textual source, but the majority opinion in National League of Cities did
not dwell on that discredited constitutional relic of the thirties. In perhaps a
puckish tweak at the dissenters, the only mention of the Tenth Amendment in the
National League of Cities majority opinion is a quote from a previous opinion
authored by National League of Cities dissenter Justice Marshall.' 15 Other than
this backhanded reference to the Tenth Amendment, there is no reference to a
specific constitutional hook for the state-sovereignty principle.
Although the constitutional source and practical logic of the National League
of Cities majority opinion was something of a puzzle, the majority had in mind a
clear and definitive notion of sovereignty when they devised their holding.
According to the majority:
We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching
to every state government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because
Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the
matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in
that manner.I 16
The citation supporting this quote is to an opinion that articulated the rather petty
proposition that states have the sovereign authority to decide where to locate their
state capitals." 7 But in National League of Cities, the Court went beyond this
narrow and uncontroversial proposition to embrace the much broader position
that the wages and hours of state employees were "functions essential to [the
states'] separate and independent existence" 18 and therefore protected aspects of
state sovereignty. The Court went on to limit more generally the ability of
113 Id (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)).
114 'The Powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
115 See Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 842-43 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S.
542, 547 n.7 (1975)) (upholding the application of federal wage and salary stabilization law to
state employees).
116 Id. at 845.
117 See id. (citing Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911)).
118 See id at 845, 851-52.
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Congress to use its Commerce Clause authority to "directly displace the States'
freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions."' I9
This general holding-i.e., that Congress could not exercise Commerce
Clause regulatory authority over the states' "traditional governmental
functions"-was the eventual undoing of National League of Cities. No one-
especially among the lower court judges who were asked to enforce the
standard-could ever figure out what a "traditional governmental function"
entailed. The relevant tradition was very much in the eye of the beholder, and this
amorphous standard led to wildly inconsistent lower court applications of the new
states' rights. When Justice Blackmun switched sides to write the Garcia opinion
overruling National League of Cities, he catalogued a representative sample of
inconsistent lower-court holdings, 120 and concluded that:
We find it difficult, if not impossible, to identify an organizing principle that
places each of the cases in the first group on one side of a line and each of the
cases in the second group on the other side. The constitutional distinction
between licensing drivers and regulating traffic, for example, or between
operating a highway authority and operating a mental health facility, is elusive at
best.12 1
Justice Blackmun noted that the Court itself had previously failed to produce a
coherent definition of the area of protected state sovereignty in the
intergovernmental taxation cases, and extrapolated from that experience that the
prospects were not good for arriving at a more satisfactory definition to apply in
the intergovernmental regulation area. 12 2
The problems Justice Blackmun identified in attempting to define the
protected area of state sovereignty were very real and, as Justice Blackmun and
the four other Garcia majority Justices concluded, probably insuperable. But even
if the members of the National League of Cities majority never articulated a
workable distinction between state and federal sovereignty, at least they
understood what the concept of sovereignty entailed. Under the National League
of Cities definition, the states were "sovereign" in the sense described in Part
II-i.e., they had exclusive, final, and enforceable authority--over any and all
matters falling within the category of "traditional governmental functions." At
least the members of the National League of Cities majority had the courage of
119 Id. at 852.
120 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1985).
121 Id at 539.
122 Id. at 540-47 (discussing various historical and non-historical tests for protected state
sovereignty, including the governmental/proprietary distinction, the "uniquely" governmental
functions test, and the "necessary" governmental functions test).
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their convictions, even if those convictions ultimately turned out to be deeply
flawed.
The same could not be said for either the Garcia majority or the Garcia
dissenters. As the spokesman for the Garcia majority, Justice Blackmun tries to
have it both ways. On one hand, Justice Blackmun quotes with approval Justice
Powell's previous statement that states "retai[n] a significant measure of
sovereign authority."' 123 On the other hand, Justice Blackmun notes that "the
sovereignty of the States is limited by the Constitution itself,"'124 and rejects the
argument that the Court can "employ freestanding conceptions of state
sovereignty when measuring congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause." 125 In overturning the holding of National League of Cities, Justice
Blackmun could have simply rejected outright the idea that the states are
"sovereign" in any meaningful sense. Instead, he gives lip-service to the concept
of state sovereignty, even while denying the states any mechanism (other than
sending state-friendly officials to federal elective offices) to enforce that
"sovereignty." Justice Blackmun concludes that "[sitate sovereign interests... are
more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the
federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power,"' 126 but
actually the Garcia majority buries the whole concept that states possess a
reservoir of sovereignty that could be used to fend off federal government
initiatives that intrude into state prerogatives.
Justice Blackmun's attempt to finesse the issue of state sovereignty can be
attributed both to intra-Court realpolitik and to the extra-Court deference to a
concept that continues to carry an emotional resonance in a country whose
collective consciousness seems still to fancy itself created by a motley collection
of yeoman democrats. Justice Powell's Garcia dissent also attempts to have it
both ways, but without the rhetorical justification of providing politically
necessary, but ultimately hollow, deference to the national political mythology of
localized political power. Justice Powell rewrites National League of Cities in
order to defend it against the many practical problems that arose from the effort to
define "traditional governmental functions." But what began in National League
of Cities as an honest attempt to define areas of sovereignty in which the state and
federal governments operate largely independent of each other becomes, in
Justice Powell's hands, an incoherent muddle of joint sovereignties in which the
states sometimes can fend off federal interference, but sometimes cannot.
The specific way Justice Powell rewrites National League of Cities is by
abandoning the concept of "traditional governmental functions"--which was the
123 Id. at 549 (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 269 (1983) (Powell, J.,
dissenting)).
124 Id at 548.
125 Id. at 550.
126 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985).
2002] 1637
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
lodestar of the original opinion-in favor of a largely undefined balancing test.
According to Justice Powell, "National League of Cities adopted a familiar type
of balancing test for determining whether Commerce Clause enactments
transgress constitutional limitations imposed by the federal nature of our system
of government."' 127 The category of "traditional governmental functions" was not
an airtight category of functions that are always insulated from federal control,
Justice Powell argued, but rather part of an ad hoc process in which "seriousness
of the problem addressed by the federal legislation at issue in that case, [is
weighed] against the effects of compliance on state sovereignty."' 128 Justice
Powell has some support for this position, in the ironic form of Justice
Blackmun's own National League of Cities concurrence, which interpreted the
holding in that case as establishing a balancing test.129 No other member of the
National League of Cities majority joined Justice Blackmun's concurrence,
however, for the very good reason that the Rehnquist majority opinion not only
did not refer even once to the concept of a balancing test, but was fundamentally
inconsistent with the Blackmun approach. The entire thrust of the Rehnquist
opinion in National League of Cities was to identify certain areas of activity in
which the federal government could not tell states what to do. Balancing the
federal interest against the state interest never entered the equation.
Having realized what the National League of Cities majority opinion really
meant, Justice Blackmun abandoned the Court's states'-rights faction to write the
Garcia majority opinion, only to have Justice Powell take the earlier Blackmun
approach and use it to reinterpret the holding of National League of Cities in a
way that purported to avoid the difficult interpretive issues that had befuddled the
lower courts in trying to make sense of the "traditional governmental functions"
concept. But Justice Powell's attempt to salvage National League of Cities
managed only to undermine the very reason that case established a judicially
enforceable variety of state sovereignty in the first place. Justice Powell cites
several justifications for judicial intervention on behalf of states opposing federal
regulatory mandates. Justice Powell offers a textual argument, a structural
argument, and a functional argument. The textual argument is that the Tenth
Amendment provides a specific textual protection of state sovereignty, which
requires judicial enforcement.' 30 The structural argument is that states serve as
127 Id. at 562 (Powell, J., dissenting).
128 Id (citation omitted).
129 See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
130 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 560 (Powell, J., dissenting). According to Justice Powell, the
Garcia majority's approach "effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to meaningless
rhetoric." Id He even chides Justice Blackmun for including in his Garcia majority opinion
"only a single passing reference to the Tenth Amendment." Id Of course, this overlooks the
fact that the National League of Cities majority opinion itself included only a single passing
reference to the Tenth Amendment in the form of a citation to an earlier opinion authored by
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"an effective 'counterpoise' to the power of the Federal Government," and will
naturally engender more political loyalty from citizens because states tend to deal
with more personalized and localized issues. 131 Finally, the functional argument
is that there are some governmental functions-such as "fire prevention, police
protection, sanitation, and public health"--which "the States and local
governments are better able [to perform] than the National Government."' 132
Whatever the underlying merits of these political and legal arguments, and
the empirical assumptions that lie behind them, the crucial fact is that each of
these rationales is more consistent with the exclusive sovereignty granted the
states by the National League of Cities majority opinion than with the balancing
test Justice Powell proposes in Garcia. As for the textual argument, the phrasing
of the Tenth Amendment treats power as a zero-sum game. "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."' 133 Under this
formulation, powers are either delegated to the United States, the states, or the
people; the powers are not shared between two governments (or between one
government and "the people"), and there is no specific provision for special
exigencies that might allow the federal government to assume powers that are not
otherwise delegated to it. If one reads the Tenth Amendment as an affirmative
grant of power to the states, instead of as a mere "truism" 134 that the states must
be able to act if the federal government cannot do so, then the natural meaning of
the Amendment is that the states have exclusive sovereign authority over some
areas, and the federal government has authority over others. This is not the
framework of a judicially crafted balancing test.
Justice Powell's other two arguments are also more compatible with the
theory of exclusive, final, and enforceable sovereignty set forth in the previous
Part than with Justice Powell's own theory of shared sovereignty embodied in a
balancing test. The argument that citizens will naturally have a stronger
relationship with their local governmental bodies than with the federal
government, 135 for example, suggests that this relationship will prevail regardless
of the national interests embodied in specific examples of federal legislation. The
logic of this political argument leads to the conclusion that, even where the
national interest is strong, the local political body should still have the authority to
avoid compliance with that national policy if the local citizenry so desires.
Conversely, the point of ceding power to a national government is to give the
Justice Marshall, which rejected state-sovereignty claims. See Nat'! League of Cities, 426 U.S.
at 842-43 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)) (upholding the
application of the federal wage and salary stabilization law to state employees).
131 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 571 (Powell, J., dissenting).
132 Id. at 575-76.
133 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
134 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941).
135 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 571-72 (Powell, J. dissenting).
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entire country a mechanism for favoring the commonweal of the entire country
over parochial interests of particular states. That a particular state government
might be very popular among those living within its borders is not just irrelevant
to the latter system; it actually attests to the need for a strong national sovereign
with the ultimate power to enact legislation and force recalcitrant states to
comply. Only in this way can the national interest prevail.
Whether one favors a system defined by the political connection forged by a
state government dealing with "personalized and localized issues," or a system
defined by the subordination of local interests to the greater national good through
federal government legislation, it is an unavoidable fact that, under both systems,
one or the other government must have the final say over policy. A system of
shared sovereignty guided only by an imprecise and constantly evolving "balance
of interests" simply produces inefficiency and incoherence without any ultimate
resolution of the basic issue: Does the nation as a whole set and enforce policy, or
do local interests? Stating the matter more colloquially: Under the shared
sovereignty system, no one knows in advance when the local tail will be allowed
to wag the national dog.
Justice Powell's final argument is that local governments are simply better
able to perform certain functions, such as "fire prevention, police protection,
sanitation, and public health." 136 This is ultimately an empirical judgment, and
the real question is whether state government or the federal government is
empowered to make that judgment. By prejudging the matter via judicial ipse
dixit, Justice Powell predetermines the key sovereignty issue in dispute, and does
so in a manner that is inconsistent with his own conclusion that these matters are
always subject to an ad hoc balancing test. If states as a matter of course are
always better able to provide fire, police, sanitation, and public health services,
what is left to factor into the balance on behalf of the federal government?
Ironically, the very fact that Justice Powell would allow the federal courts to
employ the balancing test to assess the legitimacy of state-sovereignty claims is
itself inconsistent with the basic thrust of his argument. If states are sovereign,
after all, why should they be beholden to an analysis of that sovereignty
undertaken by the primary judicial agent of the federal government? Justice
Blackmun highlighted one aspect of this ironic arrangement in his Garcia opinion
when he pointed out that it is inconsistent with the concept of state sovereignty to
have the federal courts define that sovereignty by deciding for themselves (as
even Justice Rehnquist would have them do under a National League of Cities
regime) what constitutes a "traditional governmental function." 137 Federal court
136 Id at 575 (Powell, J. dissenting).
137 Justice Blackmun states:
Any rule of state immunity that looks to the "traditional," "integral," or "necessary" nature
of governmental functions inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make
decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes.... [Tihe States
1640 [Vol. 63:1601
THE MYTH OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY
involvement is also inconsistent with Justice Powell's balancing analysis of state
sovereignty. If states are truly sovereign, then they should settle their disputes like
other sovereigns-by using the economic, political, social, and other weapons at
their disposal to force competing sovereigns to cut deals favorable to the state's
citizens and local interest groups. Like other sovereigns, each state must deal with
the consequences that attend the failure to obtain favorable deals and forge
successful coalitions with other states and the federal government to achieve its
desired end. That Justice Powell would give the federal government's courts the
ability to broker controversies between the state and federal governments-and
enforce that decision through the coercive application of federal government
power-means that he does not really view the states as sovereign. (Unless
Justice Powell views the balance as so heavily weighted in favor of the states that
a judicial decision in favor of the federal government is effectively foreclosed, in
which case the balancing test is really the National League of Cities exclusive
sovereignty concept in disguise.)
The point of this discussion is not that then-Justice Rehnquist's National
League of Cities decision provides a better framework for determining state-
sovereignty issues than does Justice Powell's. My own view is that each of these
proposals is flawed for the reasons offered by Justice Blackmun in Garcia. But
this Part speaks to a different point; it is intended to establish the narrow
conceptual proposition that once the Court starts down the state-sovereignty road,
the logic of the argument will eventually lead the Court to the rigid and exclusive
conception of sovereignty set forth in Part Ill. Attempts to avoid that conclusion
through the introduction of an escape-hatch mechanism for overriding state
sovereignty-such as that provided by Justice Powell's balancing test-must be
regarded either as ingenuously incoherent or as a disingenuous effort to return to a
regime governed by real (that is, exclusive, final, and enforceable) state
sovereignty without admitting that this is the goal. In the end, a coherent theory of
state sovereignty must mean that states possess the authority to make final policy
decisions with regard to some functions, and the federal government can do
nothing about it. In other words, state sovereignty will always amount to
something like the system described in National League of Cities.
B. Mythical Sovereignty: States 'Rights Since National League of Cities
The theory that states possess sovereign powers that can be leveraged against
the federal government did not die when the Court renounced National League of
Cities, but it did mutate. The mutated form of sovereignty cropped up in different
cannot serve as laboratories for social and economic experiment, see New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), if they must pay an added
price when they meet the changing needs of their citizenry by taking up functions that an
earlier day and a different society left in private hands.
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546.
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guises and in a variety of different contexts, including decisions involving the
Eleventh Amendment, abstention, and even the Tenth Amendment-albeit in a
kinder, gentler manifestation than the exclusive-sovereignty version of the Tenth
Amendment reflected in National League of Cities. All of these recent decisions
are united by their common presumption that states are sovereign, and also by
their common concession that the sovereignty granted to states is not absolute.
The tension inherent in this half-hearted grant of state sovereignty produces
decisions that are theoretically unsatisfying (because they contradict the essential
elements of sovereignty described in Part III), logically incoherent (because they
attempt to explain why states simultaneously are and are not sovereign), and only
inconsistently enforceable (because every case results in an unpredictable
balancing act of state and federal sovereignty interests).
In the end, the current majority on the Court seems to have decided merely to
announce the rules and ignore the inconsistencies generated by those rules. The
version of state sovereignty promoted by these decisions does not make sense, but
the assumption that states are sovereign remains the rule nevertheless.
Meanwhile, the Court avoids any serious effort to define the nature and rationale
for state sovereignty-i.e., the territory in which states have power that cannot be
trumped by the federal government-because the recent state-sovereignty
decisions acknowledge at the outset that, if the federal government legitimately
needs to impose its will on the states, the flexibility built into these decisions
permits the federal government to have its way.
A brief review of the four major areas in which the new theories of state
sovereignty are being defined will highlight the unsatisfactory nature of the recent
state-sovereignty jurisprudence. The primary question to keep in mind when
reviewing these decisions is whether the Court is serious about defending the
essentially vacuous form of sovereignty announced in these cases, or whether (in
a more sinister reading) these sovereignty cases are merely the first steps in the
march back to real state sovereignty; that is, a judicially enforced brand of state
authority defined by the three essential components of sovereignty--exclusivity,
finality, and enforceability.
1. The (Partial) Revival of the Tenth Amendment
Garcia briefly returned the Tenth Amendment to its post-Darby138 status as
an ineffectual textual artifact of an earlier era in which decentralized political
power was the constitutional norm. For all of Justice Blackmun's encomia to the
importance of the political structure in protecting the states, 139 the practical reality
138 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941).
139 The concept that the structure of national politics provides the primary safeguard for
states' rights against federal interference is most closely associated with Professor Herbert
Wechsler and Dean Jesse Choper, both of whom are cited by Justice Blackmun in defense of
the holding in Garcia. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551 n. 1 (citing JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL
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of Garcia is that the majority permits the federal government to regulate the states
under any of the federal government's enumerated powers without worrying
about judicial intervention to protect the subordinate political entities.
This exercise of judicial restraint regarding the relationship between state and
federal governments did not last long. A mere six years after Garcia, the Court
resurrected judicially enforced Tenth Amendment protections of state
prerogatives in Gregory v. Ashcroft.140 In this case, the Court held that the general
precepts of state sovereignty prohibited the federal government from applying the
federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act to state judges. 141 One year later,
in New York v. United States,142 the Court used the same theory to strike down a
federal statute forcing states to take title to low-level radioactive waste if the states
REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 175-84 (1980); Herbert Wechsler, The
Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of
the National Government, 54 COLuM. L. REv. 543 (1954)). See generally Jesse Choper, The
Scope of National Power Vis-6- Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE
L.J. 1552 (1977).
The debate over this theory continues to rage, although since Garcia the Supreme Court
has subtly renounced the structural safeguard theory by once again striking down federal
legislation on Tenth Amendment grounds in the cases discussed in the remainder of this
subpart. The specific problems with these cases are discussed extensively in the text; it is worth
noting, however, that academic commentators who continue to reject the Wechsler/Choper
structural safeguard position are relying upon the same two dubious assumptions that the Court
relies upon in National League of Cities and the post-Garcia federalism decisions. These
assumptions are: (1) that state sovereignty actually exists in a form that permits states to reject
federal policies adopted as an exercise of the federal government's otherwise legitimate
constitutional authority and (2) that the judicial protection of state sovereignty is necessary to
the same extent and for the same general reason as judicial protection of individual rights, such
as the right of free speech or the freedom from unreasonable searches. For a concise and recent
discussion of these two assumptions by scholars who reject the structural safeguard position,
see Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1477-79 (2001). The fatal flaw in these
assumptions is that a coherent theory of state sovereignty necessarily goes much farther in
providing states with authority independent of federal government control than most proponents
of state sovereignty would ever endorse explicitly. Professors Prakash and Yoo avoid
confronting this problem by noting simply that granting judicial review over federalism issues
"sheds little light upon the substantive lines that should limit the national government's
powers," before concluding that "federalism presents the courts with hard questions, the courts
cannot refuse to answer." Id at 1523. But answers to the "hard questions" go hand-in-hand with
the issue of whether the courts should exercise judicial review over such matters at all. The
premise of this article is that the only plausible meaning of "state sovereignty" requires
something like the arbitrary and schematic National League of Cities allocation of exclusive
responsibility over entire subject areas to state governments. If this premise is accurate, then one
must conclude that the judiciary could never provide a satisfactory answer to the "hard
questions" of federalism and therefore should avoid getting involved in such matters at all.
140 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
141 Id at 463-64.
142 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
2002] 1643
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
had not provided for the disposal of such waste by a certain date. 143 Finally, five
years later in Printz v. United States144 the Court struck down a federal gun
control provision requiring local law enforcement officers to perform background
checks of potential gun purchasers in the period before the federal background-
check system went into effect.' 45
Although these three cases revived the Tenth Amendment insofar as the
Court's majority once again introduced into the constitutional jurisprudence
judicially-created limits on the enforcement of federal policies against the states,
the cases were different from National League of Cities in one crucial respect. In
National League of Cities, the Court held that the Tenth Amendment absolutely
prohibited the federal government from enforcing national policies against states
in certain subject areas. If a particular activity fell within the category of
traditional governmental functions, then under National League of Cities the
regulation of that activity was allocated to the states alone, and the federal
government could not enforce against the states any policies that fell within that
category. In the post-Garcia Tenth Amendment cases, the Court merely limited-
but did not prohibit-the federal government from enforcing its policies against
the states. In these later cases, the Court evinced more concern with the
mechanisms for carrying out federal policies than with the substance of the
policies themselves.
Each of the three post-Garcia Tenth Amendment decisions imposed a
different type of limitation on the federal government. In Gregory v. Ashcroft, the
Court introduced a "plain statement rule," which requires Congress to make
unmistakably clear its intention to apply a federal statute to particular state
employees and functions. 146 As Justice White pointed out in his Gregory
concurring opinion, 147 Justice O'Connor's vaguely phrased majority opinion does
not clearly describe the precise application of this plain statement rule. In the
more broadly phrased passages of the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor alludes
to something like the discredited National League of Cities categorization of
traditional or unique governmental functions. She suggests, for example, that the
plain statement rule applies whenever a statute threatens to interfere with or
"upset the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers," 148 and also
likens the state functions at issue in Gregory to "'traditionally sensitive areas...
143 Id at 174-77.
144 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
145 Id at 933-35.
146 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460-61.
147 See id. at 478 (White, J., concurring) ("[T]he majority fails to explain the scope of its
rule. Is the rule limited to federal regulation of the qualifications of state officials?... Or does it
apply more broadly to the regulation of any 'state governmental functions'?").
148 Id. at 460.
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affecting the federal balance"' 149 and "unique" functions that "'go to the heart of
representative government."I' 1 50 Nevertheless, the actual holding of the case does
not purport to disempower the federal government when it acts in these
"traditionally sensitive" or "unique" areas; the case simply requires the federal
government to make clear its intention to apply general policies to state as well as
private actors.
In New York v. United States, the Court moved beyond a simple plain
statement rule to a broader rule prohibiting certain mechanisms for carrying out
federal legislation, although the Court again did not withdraw from the federal
government power over entire subject areas, as it had in National League of
Cities.151 Specifically, in New York v. United States, the Court prohibited
Congress from "'commandeer[ing]' state governments into the service of federal
regulatory purposes."'152 The case involved a complicated federal scheme to
provide for the safe disposal of low-level radioactive waste. The Court upheld the
portions of the statute that set forth a timetable for states to establish facilities for
the disposal of waste produced within their borders, either by building a facility
in-state or by joining a regional compact for disposal out-of-state. Also the Court
upheld federal financial penalties and incentives to pressure states into complying
with the federal timetable. 153 After upholding most of the provisions of the
statute, however, the Court struck down a provision that served as the ultimate
incentive to induce states to comply with the final deadline by which states were
required to have waste disposal facilities in place. Under this provision, states
were required to take title to all the low-level radioactive waste produced within
their borders if the state had not met the final deadline of January 1, 1996 for
disposing of the waste in an approved site.154
The Court's majority found that the "take-title" provision of the federal
statute interfered with the states' sovereign interests by shifting political
responsibility for the federal mandate to state officials. According to the New
York v. United States majority, "where the Federal Government compels States to
regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished."'155
This focus on political accountability explained the seemingly contradictory
conclusions of the majority that, on the one hand, the federal government may not
"direct or otherwise motivate the States to regulate in a particular field or a
particular way,"'156 while on the other hand, the federal government may simply
149 Id. at 461 (quoting Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989)).
150 Id. (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)).
151 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-75 (1992).
152 Id at 175.
153 Id at 171-74.
154 Id at 174-75.
155 Id. at 168.
156 Id. at 161.
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take matters into its own hands and impose an unpopular policy directly on a
reluctant state government. A state government's view on a particular policy
can always be pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause if it is contrary to the
national view, but in such a case it is the Federal Government that makes the
decision in full view of the public, and it will be federal officials that suffer the
consequences if the decision turns out to be detrimental or unpopular.157
Like Gregory v. Ashcroft, New York v. United States stands in stark contrast to the
view of state sovereignty articulated in National League of Cities: in both
Gregory and New York, the state "sovereigns" are given no authority to fend off
federal legislation with which they strongly disagree. If the federal government
adopts and implements a particular policy within the broad areas of federal
authority granted by the Constitution, then the "sovereign" states can do nothing
but accede to the federal policies.
Printz v. United States represents another variation on the same limited state-
sovereignty theme. In Printz, the Court imposed a third limitation on the federal
government's ability to implement-but not to adopt-national policy that is
binding on the states. In Printz, the Court struck down a provision in a federal gun
control statute requiring the "Chief Law Enforcement Official" in each local
jurisdiction to perform a background check of potential handgun purchasers for a
five-year period during which the federal government would establish its own
national background-check system.158 The Court interpreted this requirement as
the "compelled enlistment of state executive officers for the administration of
federal programs"' 59 in violation of the states' sovereign interest to resist being
"pressed into federal service." 160 These conclusions were premised on very broad
renditions of the concept of state sovereignty. The Court explicitly embraced the
theory of dual sovereignty 161 and envisioned a system of government defined by
two distinct political entities, "'each protected from incursion by the other, [with]
its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are
governed by it.' 1 62 The focus on the independence and insulation of the states
implies that states possess some variation of the elements of sovereignty set forth
in Part III of this article-i.e., exclusive and final control over policy, and an
ability to enforce those policies against other governmental or private entities.
157 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992).
158 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902-03, 935 (1997).
159 Id at 905.
160 Id
161 Id. at 918 ("It is incontestable that the Constitution established a system of 'dual
sovereignty."') (citation omitted).
162 Id. at 920 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S.
779, 838 (1995)).
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The odd thing about these grandiose statements on the subject of state
sovereignty is that in the very same opinion in which the Court ascribed to states
these characteristics of sovereignty, the Court also explicitly acknowledged that
such state sovereignty does not really exist. First, the Court acknowledged that
even if the federal government could not "commandeer" state executive officials
to carry out federal law, it could certainly prohibit those same officials from
obstructing federal law by enforcing contrary state policies. The Court recognized
that states owe the federal government a duty "to enact, enforce, and interpret
state law in such fashion as not to obstruct the operation of federal law, and the
attendant reality that all state actions constituting such obstruction, even
legislative Acts, are ipso facto invalid."' 63 Thus, although the Court would use
state-sovereignty principles to prohibit the enforcement of federal actions that
require state action, the Court would abandon those state-sovereignty principles
when the federal statute requires only state inaction.
The Printz Court's distinction between affirmative and negative federal
mandates has two glaring flaws. First, if the federal government can force the
state to comply with a policy that the state strongly disagrees with, then the state
cannot be said to be sovereign in the sense described in Part III, (a conception
that, as noted above, 164 is implicit in the Court's own description of sovereignty).
In other words, under the Court's own description of the current reality, the state
is not sovereign because (1) it has no exclusive control over a policy that comes
within the federal government's constitutionally enumerated authority, (2) the
state's policies in such a subject area are not final because they can always be
superceded by preemptive federal action, and (3) such preemption prohibits the
state from enforcing policies that inhibit the federal government from enforcing
its superior commands. Second, if the state is not truly sovereign over a particular
policy, then there is no logical reason to distinguish between a federal mandate
requiring the state to do something and a federal mandate requiring the state not to
do something. If a state has no sovereign authority to dictate a particular policy,
then the state is, in effect, merely a subordinate political entity. Thus, the state has
no sovereign authority to deny assistance to a superior government that-in the
Court's own expressed view-has sovereign authority to enforce that policy.
In any event, the Printz Court itself acknowledged that in at least one respect
even affirmative federal mandates require obedience by state officials. This
acknowledgment came in the Court's discussion of a state court's obligation to
enforce federal law with which the state disagrees. 165 This concession was
inevitable given the clear phrasing and unavoidable implications of the
Supremacy Clause, under which "the Laws of the United States... shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
163 Id. at 913.
164 See supra text accompanying note 162.
165 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 907.
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thereby."' 166 The Court concedes that this provision requires state judges to act
affirmatively to carry out federal law but reads this obligation simply as an
example of "'transitory' causes of action"-i.e., "laws which operated elsewhere
[and] created obligations in justice that courts of the forum state would
enforce."' 67 But as the Court itself acknowledges, state courts must enforce legal
obligations originating outside the state in large part because the federal
government requires each state to afford full faith and credit to such
obligations. 168 If the states were truly sovereign, they would each have the
unfettered ability to decide which obligations to enforce and which obligations to
ignore, much as national sovereigns decide to bind themselves by entering into
treaties. For purposes of applying theories of sovereignty, there is nothing special
about state courts as institutions. The state courts derive their authority from
whatever sovereign power the states themselves possess. State courts have no
authority to refuse to enforce federal law because the states themselves have no
such power. And if the states cannot insulate their courts from affirmative federal
directives, there is no logical argument derived from theories of sovereignty that
would permit them to insulate other branches of state government from similar
directives.
The internal contradictions in the Court's Printz opinion reflect the larger
conceptual problem evident in each of the post-Garcia Tenth Amendment
decisions: The fairly narrow and particularized holdings in these cases are based
on broad and abstractly phrased state-sovereignty principles that, if applied
consistently, would provide a far more extensive grant of authority to the states
than the holdings themselves suggest-yet the Court in each of these cases denies
that such authority exists. In Justice O'Connor's Gregory v. Ashcroft majority
opinion, for example, she expresses the view that dual sovereignty is primarily a
protection against the abuse of government power by the federal government.169
As she phrases this aspect of state sovereignty, "a healthy balance of power
between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny
and abuse from either front."'170 Thus, Justice O'Connor argues, the application of
federal age discrimination laws to override a Missouri law that establishes
mandatory retirement ages for judges "would upset the usual constitutional
balance of federal and state powers."' 71 But having defined the terms of debate in
such stark terms, Justice O'Connor then produces the tepid plain statement rule to
enforce her theory against an apparently rogue federal government. Under her
rule, the federal government is not prohibited from (in Justice O'Connor's
166 U.S. CONST. art. V1, cl. 2.
167 Printz, 521 U.S. at 907.
168 Id.
169 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
170 Id.
171 Id at 460.
1648 [Vol. 63: 1601
THE MYTH OF STATE SO VEREIGNTY
apparent view) running roughshod over the state's sovereign prerogatives; the
federal government merely has to announce in advance that this is its intent, then
proceed apace. The mountains have labored and brought forth a mouse. 172
In Justice O'Connor's New York v. United States majority opinion, she
reiterates her strong endorsement of state-sovereignty principles, 173 and at first
glance, seems to support those principles with more substantial protection of state
sovereignty than that offered by the rather flimsy procedural nicety imposed by
the Gregory plain statement rule. In the end, however, New York v. United States
leaves the states just as vulnerable to effective federal control as Gregory. Recall
that the actual holding of New York prohibited the federal government from
requiring states to take title to low-level radioactive waste generated within the
state if the state had not provided for an acceptable means of disposal of that
waste by a federally mandated date. 174 "While Congress has substantial powers to
govern the Nation directly, including in areas of intimate concern to the States,"
Justice O'Connor writes, "the Constitution has never been understood to confer
upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress'
instructions." 175
The problem with this statement is that it is not true, even as applied to the
facts in New York v. United States. This can be seen by considering how states
would be affected by each of the three ways in which the Supreme Court itself
acknowledged the federal government could deal with the problem of low-level
nuclear waste disposal. As the Court acknowledged, the federal government could
regulate the disposal of low-level radioactive waste by: (1) imposing such high
surcharges on interstate shipments of radioactive waste that producers could not
afford to ship the waste at all; 176 (2) using federal appropriations and commerce
clause authority to purchase land inside a state for a waste disposal site and
require all waste produced in that state to be disposed of at that site; 177 and (3)
using federal commerce clause authority to preempt any state legislation that
inhibited the location and operation of federal or privately operated low-level
nuclear waste dump sites inside a state.' 78 In effect the federal government
172 See HORACE, Ars Poetica, in THE SATIRES OF HORACE AND PERSIUS 190, 194 (Niall
Rudd trans., Penguin Books 2d prtg. 1987) (approx. 19 B.C.) ("What can emerge in keeping
with such a cavernous promise?/The mountains will labor and bring to birth a comical
mouse.").
173 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155-59 (1992).
174 See supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
175 New York, 505 U.S. at 162.
176 See id. at 171.
177 Id. at 182 ("[l]t would be well within the authority of either federal or state officials to
choose where the disposal sites will be .... ).
178 Id. at 167 ("[W]here Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the
Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress' power to offer States the choice of
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therefore has the power to remove altogether any state's authority to deal with the
issue of low-level radioactive waste disposal within that state. If that is true, then
the state sovereignty protected by the anti-commandeering holding of New York is
truly a hollow power; a state's authority may be rendered entirely irrelevant by
the federal government. If the federal government can use its power of adopting
and enforcing preemptive legislation to render the state irrelevant (as the New
York majority acknowledges), then the state is not in any significant sense
"sovereign," and so the anti-commandeering holding is revealed as little more
than a reflection of the Supreme Court majority's punctilious credo of political
etiquette: the federal government can make the states obey any policy it wants,
but it cannot force the states to like it.
In the end, all three of the Supreme Court's post-Garcia Tenth Amendment
cases contain an internal conflict that can only be resolved in one of two ways.
The first way would have the Court adopt wholeheartedly the state-sovereignty
rationale of the post-Garcia decisions, in which case the holdings of those cases
represent merely the first step toward a return to judicial protection of true state
sovereignty, in the form of state independence from federal control over policies
falling within the state's sovereign territory. The second way of reconciling the
internal conflict of these cases would involve conceding the failure of National
League of Cities and recognizing the impossibility of installing a system of
ineffectual state "sovereigns" that cannot make and enforce policies against the
federal government. The first choice would require a return to the practical
difficulties of National League of Cities. The second choice would require
overruling the narrow holdings of Gregory, New York, and Printz. In any event,
the current situation-in which the states are "sovereign" in name only-is
indefensible as a coherent constitutional doctrine.
2. The Intricate Nightmare of the Eleventh Amendment
The large and growing body of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is a
second major area defined by multiple and contradictory assertions about state
sovereignty. Although the common perception-fed by the Court's own recent
rhetoric-is that the Eleventh Amendment provides states with an impermeable
cloak of sovereign immunity from process in federal court, in fact the Court has
always denied states the sort of total independence from external judicial control
that is normally associated with the concept of sovereignty. In recent years, the
Court has made ever-broader statements about the significance of state
sovereignty as the basis for its Eleventh Amendment holdings, but in reality the
Eleventh Amendment cloak of sovereign immunity is defined by large gaps that
allow the true sovereign-i.e., the federal government-to enforce its will on the
regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal
regulation.").
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states in some ways, but not others. The question is whether concepts of state
sovereignty used to deny the federal government access to some enforcement
mechanisms against lawbreaking states make sense in a context in which the
Court itself repeatedly stresses that "sovereign" states are not allowed to disobey
federal law.
The general contours of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence are by now very
clear. The Eleventh Amendment saga begins, of course, with the 1793 Supreme
Court decision Chisholm v. Georgia,179 in which the Court ruled against the state
of Georgia in a diversity action brought in the Supreme Court and based on
Georgia assumpsit law. Although it is uniformly recognized that the Eleventh
Amendment was enacted in response to this case, in the years following the
ratification of the Amendment the particular history of its enactment, as well as
the text itself, would have little to do with the development of modem Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence. The modem Court's five-member majority has
summarized this phenomenon ofjudicial interpolation:
[W]e long have recognized that blind reliance upon the text of the Eleventh
Amendment is "to strain the Constitution and the law to a construction never
imagined or dreamed of."... The text dealt in terms only with the problem
presented by the decision in Chisholm; in light of the fact that the federal courts
did not have federal-question jurisdiction at the time the Amendment was passed
(and would not have it until 1875), it seems unlikely that much thought was
given to the prospect of federal-question jurisdiction over the States. 180
As this quotation indicates, the diversion of Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence from both the text and history of the Amendment coincided with
the Court's expansion of that Amendment to cover the federal courts' newly
granted federal question jurisdiction in the notorious Hans v. Louisiana decision
in 1890.181 This development greatly increased both the importance and the
theoretical and practical complexities of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. It is
one thing to say that the states cannot immunize themselves from the operation of
their own law; it is quite another to say that the states are immune automatically
from the operation of federal law.
Much of the debate over the Eleventh Amendment has centered on the
legitimacy of the Court's expansion of the Eleventh Amendment's scope in Hans.
179 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
180 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69-70 (1996) (citations omitted).
181 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).
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Dissenting Justices-in particular Justice Brennan 18 2 and more recently Justice
Souter183-and several academic commentators 184 have argued vigorously that
the Eleventh Amendment was never intended to enshrine state sovereign
immunity as a defense to federal question claims raised against states in federal
court. If these critiques of the modem Court's expansive Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence are correct, then the entire enterprise is at best judicial lawmaking
and at worst intellectually and legally duplicitous judicial lawmaking. But the
most interesting thing about the modem Court's Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence is not that it may be based entirely on a huge historical and
theoretical mistake; the most interesting thing about that jurisprudence is that the
Court has never been willing to follow its principles to their logical conclusion.
Whether the Court's expansion of the Eleventh Amendment's scope in Hans was
originally justified is therefore less significant than the inconsistency of the
Court's action in haphazardly applying that expanded body of law in ensuing
years. The deep inconsistency of the Court's Eleventh Amendment decisions is
the more significant issue because it indicates that the state-sovereignty principles
the Court relies upon to justify those decisions are themselves both conceptually
flawed and practically unworkable. In this sense, the Court's Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence shares the problems evident in the post-Garcia Tenth
Amendment cases discussed in the previous Part. A brief review of the Court's
conflicting Eleventh Amendment rules will illustrate this conclusion.
Hans set in motion a series of decisions that created the maze known as
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. First, in recognition of the obvious fact that
a consistent application of Hans would render enforcement of federal law
impossible, the Court ruled in Ex parte Young that federal courts could issue
injunctions against state officials to force those officials to obey federal law.' 85
The theory of Ex parte Young is that in lawsuits brought against state officials to
enforce federal law those officials are being sued in their personal, rather than
their official capacities; therefore, federal court injunctive relief in such cases does
not impinge upon the state sovereignty protected by the Eleventh Amendment
because the state is not really involved in the case. 186 Of course, as Justice Harlan
182 See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
183 See Seminole Tribe. 517 U.S. at 100 (Souter, J., dissenting).
184 See William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant ofJurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against
Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1033, 1034 (1983); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment
and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889, 1894-95 (1983).
185 Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908).
186 The Court noted:
If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal
Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the
superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or
1652 [Vol. 63:1601
THE MYTH OF STATE SO VEREIGNTY
pointed out in his Ex parte Young dissent, 187 this explanation never made much
practical sense when viewed in the context of real-world litigation, and even less
sense as a matter of theory when the concept of state action came into play.1
88
When a federal court rules against a state official in a lawsuit regarding that
official's failure to obey federal law, the state itself is being forced to conform its
representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual
conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the
supreme authority of the United States.
Id. at 159-60.
187 Justice Harlan reasoned:
Let it be observed that the suit instituted by Perkins and Shepard in the Circuit Court
of the United States was, as to the defendant Young, one against him as, and only because
he was, Attorney General of Minnesota. No relief was sought against him individually but
only in his capacity as Attorney General. And the manifest, indeed the avowed and
admitted, object of seeking such relief was to tie the hands of the State so that it could not
in any manner or by any mode of proceeding, in its own courts, test the validity of the
statutes and orders in question. It would therefore seem clear that within the true meaning
of the Eleventh Amendment the suit brought in the Federal court was one, in legal effect,
against the State-as much so as if the State had been formally named on the record as a
party ....
Id at 173-74 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
188 In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 6 (1883), the Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment applies only to state action. In Ex parte Young, the Court held that the Eleventh
Amendment embodiment of state sovereign immunity does not bar federal courts from issuing
injunctions against state officials who are violating federal law because such suits are not really
suits against the state, but are instead suits against private individuals (i.e., the state officials)
acting beyond the scope of their official authority. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. at 155-56. But if
this theory is accurate, then state action would be lacking in all Exparte Young lawsuits, and
therefore the officials could not be sued for violating the federal constitution because that
document applies only to state action. The Court resolved this anomaly five years after Exparte
Young by simply creating another theory of state action to apply to the merits of lawsuits
enforcing federal constitutional rights against state officials. According to the Court:
[T]he theory of the [Fourteenth] Amendment is that where an officer or other
representative of a State in the exercise of the authority with which he is clothed misuses
the power possessed to do a wrong forbidden by the Amendment, inquiry concerning
whether the State has authorized the wrong is irrelevant and the Federal judicial power is
competent to afford redress for the wrong by dealing with the officer and the result of his
exertion of power.
Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 287 (1913). In a more recent
variation on the same theme, the Court held in Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991), that the
state's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity does not protect a state employee sued in his
or her personal capacity for constitutional violations despite the official nature of the
employee's actions. Thus, state officials involved in federal court lawsuits over the application
of federal constitutional rights to the conduct of their official duties are simultaneously private
actors (for purposes of Eleventh Amendment jurisdiction) and state actors (for purposes of
determining the merits of a federal constitutional claim).
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behavior to federal law. The Supreme Court is happy to tolerate that conclusion,
notwithstanding that such coerced conformity interferes directly with the state's
"sovereign" independence.
These obvious problems have led the Court in modem times to dispense with
even the pretense that Ex parte Young is anything but an outright "fiction"' 189
made necessary by the intolerable consequences of the Court's bold expansion of
the Eleventh Amendment to cover federal question cases in Hans v. Louisiana.
Having abandoned its reliance on the illogically formalistic notion that a state
official is really being sued as a private individual instead of as a representative of
the state, the Court has had to come up with an alternative explanation for not
permitting lawsuits directly against the real party in interest-i.e., the state itself.
The alternative the Court has crafted to explain the necessity of the Ex parte
Young mechanism is the concept of state sovereignty. The Court explains:
While the constitutional principle of sovereign immunity does pose a bar to
federal jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting States.... this is not the
only structural basis of sovereign immunity implicit in the constitutional design.
Rather, "[tihere is also the postulate that States of the Union, still possessing
attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without their consent, save
where there has been 'a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the
convention."'... This separate and distinct structural principle is not directly
related to the scope of the judicial power established by Article IIl, but inheres in
the system of federalism established by the Constitution. 190
But as in the Court's recent Tenth Amendment decisions, the application of
the state-sovereignty principle in the Eleventh Amendment area is riddled with
multiple inconsistencies. The increasingly byzantine rules that govern Eleventh
Amendment law cannot be explained by reference to the concept of state
sovereignty because many of those rules-such as Ex parte Young-specifically
trump any claim of state sovereignty by permitting the federal courts to enforce
federal law against states through injunctions enforceable by contempt sanctions.
The Exparte Young mechanism of enforcing federal law is far more intrusive into
state prerogatives than some other mechanisms that the Court has refused to
uphold on the theory that they would violate the states' sovereign independence.
189 See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 281 (1997) (referring to the "Ex
parte Young fiction"); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. I, 26 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (referring to "the fiction established in Exparte Young"); Monell v. Dept. of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 712 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (referring to the "fiction of Exparte
Young"). The Court long ago refrained even from requiring plaintiffs to formally plead Exparte
Young cases against state officials in their individual capacities, choosing instead to look to the
"course of proceedings" to determine whether the defendant is being sued in his personal or
official capacities. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985).
190 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730 (1999) (quoting Principality of Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934)) (citations omitted).
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In Edelman v. Jordan, for example, the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh
Amendment bars lower federal courts from ordering the states to pay any
retroactive relief-even the restitution of federal social welfare funds that the
states had impermissibly withheld from qualified recipients. 191 Edelman involved
the federal Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled program, which required states
administering the program to distribute federal money to qualified recipients
within thirty to forty-five days. 192 The state of Illinois had withheld money for as
long as four months. 193 The Supreme Court reversed a lower court order
requiring the state to pay money that had been withheld in the past, on the
grounds that such funds would necessarily come out of the state treasury and
therefore negatively affect the state's current budget. 194 But the Supreme Court
simultaneously upheld the lower court injunction requiring the state to conform its
behavior to the federal requirements in the future, 195 which would affect not only
the state's current budget, but also every other budget in the future for as long as
the state participated in the federal program and the federal program contained a
rapid distribution schedule.
The Court explained the difference between impermissible retroactive relief
and permissible prospective relief by reference to the relative effects on the state
budget. "[T]he subsequent ordering by a federal court of retroactive payments to
correct delays in such processing will invariably mean there is less money
available for payments for the continuing obligations of the public aid system.",' 96
In other words, the retroactive portion of the Edelman order dealt with a situation
in which the state had already spent the money that would be necessary to
reimburse those aged, blind, and disabled citizens whose money had been
illegally withheld, whereas the money to satisfy the prospective portion of the
order was still in the state's coffers. The Court recognized that future compliance
with the federal statute would have a financial effect on the state since the state
would have to spend money that state officials would prefer to allocate to other
programs, but the Court dismissed the long-term financial effect as a "necessary
consequence of compliance in the future with a substantive federal-question
determination." 197 This is obviously true, but it is a mystery why the financial
effects of future compliance are any less intrusive into the "sovereign" activities
of the states than retroactive enforcement of the same obligatory federal statutory
mandate. A truly sovereign entity would have authority to withhold money in the
191 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,678 (1974).
192 Id. at 654.
193 Id. at 655-56.
194 Id. at 665.
195 Id at 664-65.
196 Id. at 666 n. 11.
197 Edleman v. Jordan. 415 U.S. 651. 668 (1974).
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past and the future; an entity that is not sovereign would not have the authority to
withhold the money at all.
The Court's approach to state power in Edelman cannot be properly
categorized as the recognition of state sovereignty because obligating the state to
obey the federal law at all means that the state is not, with regard to that mandate,
sovereign. And if the state lacks the sovereign power to avoid complying with the
federal government's commands in the future, then it is illogical to permit the
state to avoid suffering the consequences of its violations of the same mandate in
the past. It is as if the Court devised a regime of criminal law under which
criminals could be barred from violating the law in the future but were given
immunity from any sanctions for violations that occurred before they got caught.
The Edelman distinction between retroactive and prospective relief is only
one of the myriad instances in which the Court applies the concept of state
sovereignty inconsistently in the Eleventh Amendment cases. Other rules are
equally contradictory. For example, the Court has long adhered to the rule that the
federal government as a litigant is not bound by Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity rules and may therefore sue states directly for all forms of relief.198 In
other words, the Edelman retroactive relief restriction does not apply when the
federal government itself sues a state in federal court. The Court's rationale is that
an exemption to the Eleventh Amendment is necessary for the federal
government on the grounds that "the permanence of the Union might be
endangered if to some tribunal was not entrusted the power to determine
[controversies involving the States] according to the recognized principles of
law."'199 Of course, this explanation would also justify federal court intervention
on behalf of private litigants to enforce federal law against recalcitrant states. The
"permanence of the Union" presumably refers to the sovereign power of the
federal government to make and enforce national policy. This power is
undermined whenever federal law is violated by subordinate political entities, and
the erosion of the true sovereign's power does not change depending on whether a
private citizen or the federal government itself is in court to defend federal law.
Conversely, if the states indeed have a sovereign interest in controlling their own
budgets without interference from the competing national sovereign, then it
should not be relevant that an agent of the federal executive, rather than an
aggrieved private party, has urged the federal judiciary to intervene.
Similar inconsistencies appear in the Court's recent extension of the Eleventh
Amendment to prohibit private entities from bringing complaints against states in
federal administrative agencies. In Federal Maritime Commission v. South
Carolina State Ports Authority,200 the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment
198 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.14 (1996), reaffirming United
States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892).
199 United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. at 645.
200 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002).
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barred federal agencies from adjudicating private complaints in order to
determine whether state agencies had violated federal law. The Court's rationale
for expanding the reach of the Eleventh Amendment (which by its terms only
applies to "the Judicial power") 20 1 from the federal courts to agencies of the
Executive branch stems from the Court's perceived need to protect the states'
delicate sensibilities. The Court asserts that "[t]he preeminent purpose of state
sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their
status as sovereign entities." 20 2 Likewise, "the primary function of sovereign
immunity is not to protect State treasuries.... but to afford the States the dignity
and respect due sovereign entities." 20 3 Thus, the Court concludes:
[I]f the Framers thought it an impermissible affront to a State's dignity to be
required to answer the complaints of private parties in federal courts, we cannot
imagine that they would have found it acceptable to compel a State to do exactly
the same thing before the administrative tribunal of an agency .... 204
For all the Court's talk about "afford[ing] the States the dignity and respect
due sovereign entities," 205 in the end the Court recoils from barring federal
agencies from intruding directly into any situation in which the agency believes a
state is violating federal law. The Court acknowledges that the federal agency:
remains free to investigate alleged violations of [federal law], either upon its own
initiative or upon information supplied by a private party... and to institute its
own administrative proceeding against a [State] .... Additionally, the [agency]
"may bring suit in a district court of the United States to enjoin conduct in
violation of [the Act]." 206
As Justice Breyer's dissent explains, the Court's ruling will make the enforcement
of federal law more difficult,20 7 but federal law remains supreme and the states
must obey that law whether they like it or not.
201 U.S. CONST. amend. Xl (emphasis added).
202 SC. State Ports Authority, 122 S. Ct. at 1874.
203 Id. at 1879.
204 Id. at 1874.
205 Id. at 1879.
206 Id. at 1878-79 (quoting 46 U.S.C. app. § 1710(h)(1) (1994)).
207 Justice Breyer contends:
The decision, while permitting an agency to bring enforcement actions against States,
forbids it to use agency adjudication in order to help decide whether to do so.
Consequently the agency must rely more heavily upon its own informal staff
investigations in order to decide whether a citizen's complaint has merit. The natural result
is less agency flexibility, a larger federal bureaucracy, less fair procedure, and potentially
less effective law enforcement.
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Despite the Court's sensitive appreciation of state feelings, the fact remains
that states violating federal law do not deserve respect, and their dignity is as
meaningless as any other lawbreaker's because true state sovereignty does not
exist. By recognizing ultimate federal agency power to enforce federal law
against states, the Court itself recognizes that states are in the end no different
than any other corporate entity operating within the territory governed by the
federal government. In this respect the state of South Carolina is no more
sovereign than General Motors.
The inconsistencies in the Court's application of state-sovereignty theory in
the Eleventh Amendment cases persists because the attribution of real sovereignty
to the states would, if interpreted and applied consistently, undermine the basis of
all exceptions to the rule that federal law may not be enforced in court against
lawbreaking states. This logic would apply most strongly to the oldest and most
important exception to state sovereign immunity, Ex parte Young-the premier
tool of federal enforcement power against renegade states. Ex parte Young is
simply inconsistent with any notion that the states are independent sovereigns.
Justice Harlan cited this very principle in his Exparte Young dissent. If states may
be sued in federal courts through their employees and agents, Justice Harlan
argued:
It would enable the subordinate Federal courts to supervise and control the
official action of the States as if they were "dependencies" or provinces. It would
place the States of the Union in a condition of inferiority never dreamed of when
the Constitution was adopted or when the Eleventh Amendment was made a part
of the Supreme Law of the Land.208
A minority of the present membership of the Supreme Court has returned to
this theme. Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, has argued that
Ex parte Young should be applied narrowly, and only after a case-by-case
examination of several factors to determine whether the state's interests should be
overridden by the plaintiff's interest in enforcing the federal claim. 209 "The Young
exception may not be applicable if the suit would 'upset the balance of federal
and state interests that [the Eleventh Amendment] embodies.' 210 But it would be
an odd balance if plaintiffs seeking redress for violation of a federal claim had no
federal avenue for relief whatsoever. Justice Kennedy's opinion comes closer
Id at 1888 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
208 Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 175 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
209 See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 270-80 (1997) (plurality opinion).
The factors to be considered include: (1) the availability of a state forum, id. at 270-74, (2) the
nature of the federal issue, id at 274-78, and (3) the presence of other "special factors
counseling hesitation," id at 280 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403
U.S. 388, 396 (1971).
210 Id. at 277 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,277 (1986)).
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than any other modem statement from the Supreme Court to providing a negative
answer to the real issue in these state sovereignty/Eleventh Amendment cases:
Can the federal government force the states to obey federal law? In rejecting the
Kennedy approach, Justice O'Connor and the two other Justices who usually join
the current majority's expansive approach to Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
cite basic principles of federal supremacy: "We have frequently acknowledged
the importance of having federal courts open to enforce and interpret federal
rights. '211 Unfortunately, most aspects of Eleventh Amendment law outside the
context of Ex parte Young operate to deny the importance of both the federal
forum and the enforceability of federal rights generally.212 As in its modem Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court begins its Eleventh Amendment decisions
trying to balance state sovereignty and federal supremacy but ends up producing
nothing more than doctrinal incoherence and confusion.
211 Id. at 293 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
212 Limitations on federal court jurisdiction have the effect of rendering federal law
completely unenforceable against states in two major contexts. First, in Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 61-76 (1996), the Court closed one window for holding states
accountable in federal court for violating federal law by prohibiting Congress from using its
Commerce Clause authority to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Thus,
Congress cannot by statute subject states to federal court jurisdiction in any legislation that is
not passed under the Court's increasingly narrow conception of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (rejecting statutory
abrogation of states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in the federal Americans with Disabilities
Act on the grounds that the statute was not a valid exercise of Congress' Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement authority); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000)
(rejecting statutory abrogation of states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act on the grounds that the statute was not a valid exercise of
Congress' Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 637-48 (1999) (rejecting statutory abrogation of
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal patent laws on the grounds that the statute
was not a valid exercise of Congress' Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority). Several
major federal statutes that provide for exclusive federal court enforcement-including
bankruptcy, antitrust, and copyright statutes-were enacted under constitutional authority other
than the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, since Congress may not subject states to federal
court enforcement and since state courts may not enforce these statutes at all, states are
effectively immune from these federal statutes altogether. The current majority on the Supreme
Court has recognized this consequence and seemingly approved of it (although the majority
denies that this exclusion is significant). See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72 n. 16.
The second situation in which federal law may be effectively unenforceable involves state
violations of federal statutes that are concluded by the time litigation begins. In that case,
Edelman prohibits retroactive relief against states, and the doctrine of qualified immunity will
often prohibit retroactive relief against state officials who are sued in their personal capacities.
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982) (providing qualified immunity against
civil liability for a public official who violates federal rights as long as the official does not
violate any law "clearly established at that time").
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3. Abstention and "Our Federalism"
The current five-Justice majority of the Rehnquist Court on Tenth and
Eleventh Amendment matters is not the first modem alignment of Justices on the
Court to finesse the problems inherent in the concept of state sovereignty by
granting states only partial authority to avoid federal mandates. The Court's
Younger abstention jurisprudence provides an example of limitations placed on
federal courts during a slightly earlier era, which reflects many of the conceptual
problems with state sovereignty that are becoming increasingly evident in the
Court's modem Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. From the perspective of
those seeking strong enforcement of federal law, abstention jurisprudence
presents an even more problematic area than that governed by the Eleventh
Amendment cases, if for no other reason than that the abstention doctrine allows
far fewer ways to avoid the limitations imposed on federal courts than those
available under the Eleventh Amendment.
Younger abstention refers to the doctrine that federal courts must abstain from
hearing cases involving federal issues that are already being litigated in state fora.
The Court's Younger v. Harris opinion imposed this mandate in 1971. 2 13 In its
original manifestation, the mandate applied only when the federal court was
asked to litigate federal issues that were already being litigated in an ongoing state
criminal proceeding.214 During the decade following Younger, the doctrine
expanded to require federal courts to abstain in favor of state civil court
proceedings if the state was a party and the subject of the proceeding was closely
related to the criminal law. 215 Then, in 1987 the Court expanded the doctrine
again to encompass all state civil proceedings, even if the state itself was not a
party.216 At approximately the same time, the Younger abstention doctrine was
expanded to include state administrative proceedings, as long as the state
provided some judicial review for the administrative determinations. 217
213 401 U.S. 37, 38-42 (1971).
2 14 Id. at 43-45, 53.
215 See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 594 (1975) (ruling on a civil public
nuisance action against a theater showing obscene movies); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 334-
39 (1977) (deciding whether there is criminal contempt for failing to pay civil judgments);
Trainor v. Hemandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977) (considering a civil action to recover
fraudulently obtained welfare funds).
216 Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14 (1987) (requiring a lower federal court to
abstain from hearing a due process challenge to a Texas state court's appellate bond
requirement in a civil action between two private parties).
217 See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schs., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 626-28
(1986).
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The Younger abstention doctrine stems from the traditional rule that equity
courts will not enjoin ongoing criminal proceedings.2 18 The controversial part of
Younger is that it extends this doctrine to situations in which the judicial officers
of an inferior governmental entity-i.e., the states-are allegedly misapplying the
law of the superior governmental entity-i.e., the federal government. Indeed,
several years prior to the Court's reaffirmation of the equitable abstention doctrine
in Younger, the Court had held that federal courts did not have to defer to state
court determinations in many First Amendment (and by implication other
constitutional rights) cases. 219 In Younger, the Court not only squelched the
suggestion that violations of federal law generally justify federal court
intervention to fend off state court criminal proceedings, 220 but also went beyond
the traditional equitable basis of the abstention doctrine to ground the abstention
218 The Court's earlier application of this doctrine arrived at the same result as Younger,
but relied solely on the federal courts' lack of equity jurisdiction, without emphasizing a state-
sovereignty basis for the ruling. See Douglas v. City ofJeannette, which held:
Notwithstanding the authority of the district court, as a federal court, to hear and
dispose of the case, petitioners are entitled to the relief prayed only if they establish a cause
of action inequity. Want of equity jurisdiction, while not going to the power of the court to
decide the cause .... may nevertheless, in the discretion of the court, be objected to on its
own motion.... Especially should it do so where its powers are invoked to interfere by
injunction with threatened criminal prosecutions in a state court.
319 U.S. 157, 162 (1943) (citations omitted).
219 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 482-92 (1965). In Dombrowski, the Court held
that federal courts did not have to abstain where "statutes arejustifiably attacked on their face as
abridging free expression, or as applied for the purpose of discouraging protected activities." Id.
at 489-90. It is fair to assume the Court did not intend to stop with the First Amendment. Owen
Fiss has pointed out that Justice Brennan, who authored the Dombrowski majority opinion, had
already concluded that the expansion of federal jurisdiction subsequent to the Civil War
fundamentally altered the legal landscape by providing plaintiffs seeking to enforce federal
rights the option of choosing to vindicate those rights in what they perceived to be a friendly
federal court rather than a hostile state court. See Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J.
1103, 1107 (1977). The traditional equity rules simply had been superceded by the expansion of
federal rights and the development of mechanisms to enforce those rights. In Fiss' succinct
summary of this point, "Dombrowski was of course not a struggle about remedies but about
judges." Id. at 1116.
220 The Court effectively overruled Dombrowski in Younger, although it recognized that a
shell of the Dombrowski exception to the abstention mandate would apply in situations of bad
faith harassment in the state courts or where the state statute being challenged was "'flagrantly
and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and
paragraph."' Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971) (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S.
387, 402 (1941)). Two years prior to Younger, the Supreme Court itself had struck down by a
unanimous vote a statute essentially identical to the statute challenged in Younger. See
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444-45, 449 (1969). The fact that the Younger Court
refused to apply the flagrant unconstitutionality exception to a statute that easily fit the flagrant




mandate on the much broader foundation of state sovereignty. In particular, the
Court asserted that state-sovereignty issues would be implicated if federal courts
consistently enforced federal law in the face of contrary state court
determinations. Thus, after Younger, it was not the structure of traditional equity
jurisprudence that prevented federal courts from intervening to protect claimants'
federal rights, but rather the superior sovereign interests of the states whose agents
were violating the federal law that they were supposedly bound to obey.
The version of state-sovereignty principles on which the Court based its
concern was labeled "Our Federalism." 221 The term was said to represent:
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire
country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance
of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate
ways.222
This conception does not entail "blind deference to 'States' Rights,"' the Court
declared, but rather
a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and
National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though
it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always
endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate
activities of the States.223
Younger has been heavily criticized from several different angles. Much has
been made of the Court's misreading of history,224 of the Court's improper
conflation of equity law and federalism, 225 and of the inadequacy of the state
criminal prosecution to provide systematic vindication of federal rights. 226 There
is a much more basic problem with Younger-the case not only improperly
intermingled equity law and federalism, but also improperly viewed the state
court institutions as somehow worthy of respect despite the fact that they were
221 Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
222 Id.
223 Id
224 See Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Cases
Dombrowski Forgot, 46 U. CHi. L. REV. 636 (1979) (noting numerous instances where federal
courts enjoined future prosecutions based on invalid state statutes); Burton D. Wechsler,
Federal Courts, State Criminal Law and the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 740 (1974)
(arguing that prior to Younger federal courts routinely invalidated state criminal law and
enjoined prosecutions based on statutes that violated federal law).
225 See Fiss, supra note 219.
226 See Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Need for
Prospective Relief 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 193.
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violating the federal law by which they were bound. Neither Younger nor its
progeny have ever suggested that state courts are not bound by the federal law
that they are supposedly enforcing. Yet, Younger holds that, although the states
are not sovereign in the sense that state law is superior to federal law, the states
are sovereign in the sense that the structural components of the state-in this case
the state courts-must be afforded deference by the federal courts even when they
are misapplying federal law.
If state sovereignty is viewed through the lens of the concept of sovereignty
set forth in the previous Part, it is difficult to justify the sort of structural (as
opposed to policy) sovereignty set forth in Younger. As the conception of
sovereignty set forth in the previous Part makes clear, sovereignty is primarily a
means of allocating authority to make and enforce policy as law. The
governmental structures of a sovereign entity are, therefore, merely the tools by
which to implement the primary function of sovereignty-i.e., to make and
enforce policy. If a given structure does not represent the authority to make and
enforce policy, then that structure does not deserve respect as the agent of a
sovereign entity. It would be one thing if the superior sovereign (defined as the
entity that does have authority to make and enforce policy) decided as a matter of
efficiency to allocate to the subordinate governmental entity (here, the state
courts) the enforcement of any federal law that arises in the normal course of that
subordinate entity's affairs. But Younger states as a matter of federal
constitutional law that the relevant entities of the superior government-i.e., the
federal courts-have no authority to interfere with the subordinate state entity,
even to correct the subordinate entity's failure to enforce the superior entity's law.
The logical corollary of Younger is the proposition that the state courts are
just as capable as the federal courts of determining the meaning of federal law.
The state courts have taken this corollary to heart. State courts not only routinely
review claims of federal law and reach results different than those reached by the
federal courts, they also frequently decide federal questions in ways that directly
contradict the interpretation of federal law given by the lower federal courts
governing their territory.227 As one Texas state court summarized its perception
of state judicial independence, "[w]e are not bound to follow [a Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals decision] merely because Texas lies within the
geographical limits of the Fifth Circuit. [That decision] is as persuasive as its
logic." 228 The hubris of state courts that refuse to follow the definitive
interpretations of federal law made by the federal courts with jurisdiction over the
227 See Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing into the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the Standards
State Judges Should Use to Ascertain Federal Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1143, 1153(1999) ("The state courts take an extraordinary number of different positions on the 'elusive'
question of the effect of lower federal court decisions. The positions fall on a spectrum ranging
from 'slavishly follow' to 'totally disregard' and include just about every position imaginable in
between.").
228 Barstow v. State, 742 S.W.2d 495, 500-01 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
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state's territory is remarkable, but it is only a short step from the principle of
deference toward state courts at the heart of Younger.
As a matter of sovereignty theory, it is inconsistent to grant state courts the
power to make definitive determinations of federal law that are at odds with the
interpretations of federal courts themselves. If federal law is supreme-as
Younger and the other abstention cases assume-then that law is binding on the
states because they are not "sovereign" in the sense of that term discussed in the
previous Part of this article. Yet, if the states may freely interpret federal law in
their own self-interest (or at least against the federal interest in particular policies),
as Younger effectively permits, then the state courts are effectively negating the
sovereign power of the federal government. The judicial institutions of a
particular government derive their power from the sovereign authority of the
overall government itself. Thus, if a state government cannot avoid obeying
federal law, as the Supreme Court routinely acknowledges, then state courts
should not receive deference in situations where their actions essentially do just
that.
Younger is important not only because it removes enforcement of federal law
from the exclusive control of federal courts, but also because it removes
interpretation of federal law from the exclusive control of federal courts. As
Justice Harlan noted in objecting to the Court's pre-Younger tendency to allow
federal court intervention in state proceedings that violate federal law,
"[u]nderlying the Court's major premise... seems to be the unarticulated
assumption that state courts will not be as prone as federal courts to vindicate
constitutional rights promptly and effectively." 229 This is indeed the assumption
traditionally used to justify favoring federal courts to enforce federal law,230 but
the more important theoretical point about Younger is that it permits the state
courts to dictate the meaning of federal law that those courts have no sovereign
authority to control. The power and authority of the state courts are subordinate to
the sovereign power of the national government whose constitutional authority
creates federal law and gives it force. Younger ignores this reality by permitting
the state court tail to wag the federal law dog, while inconsistently maintaining
that federal law is supreme. As with other areas in which the Court has granted
states only partial sovereignty, Younger attributes to states characteristics of
sovereignty that in the end the Court admits the states really do not have while it
denies to the federal government effective power to enforce political authority
that the Court admits the federal government does have. This is the defining
paradox of the modem Court's states'-rights jurisprudence.
229 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,499 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
230 The classic statement of federal court superiority in matters of interpreting and
enforcing federal law is Burt Neubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1105 (1977).
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4. State Sovereignty and the Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause is a final area in which the Supreme Court has
recently used the concept of state sovereignty to limit federal authority in
inconsistent ways. The Court has been more subtle in relying on the concept of
state sovereignty to limit federal power under the Commerce Clause than it has in
the other three areas discussed in this Part, but state sovereignty clearly provides
the broad theoretical basis for the Court's recent Commerce Clause decisions. To
the extent that the Court finds itself once again groping toward a formal
delineation of federal and state power, the Court's recent Commerce Clause
decisions may represent a return to the National League of Cities style of state-
sovereignty jurisprudence. This may produce a more logical scheme of
sovereignty decisions, but only at the risk of thrusting the Court back into the
morass of unsatisfactory formalistic determinations that the Court found
untenable in a previous generation of Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence.
In theory, the state-sovereignty restrictions placed on Congress's power since
United States v. Lopez231 are merely ancillary to the routine matter of interpreting
the Commerce Clause language of Article I. The actual holding of Lopez, after all,
is simply that the mere possession of guns within one thousand feet of a school is
not "commerce" within the meaning of Article I, section 8 of the Constitution.232
But the background of this textual interpretation is a theoretical assumption about
the relative limits of federal and state sovereignty, and the proper roles of federal
and state governments. Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Lopez refers
to this assumption only in passing, as if the underlying principle were so clear as
to go unmentioned. If the Court were to uphold federal regulation of gun
possession in proximity to schools, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued, "there never
[would] be a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local," 233
because Congress could use the Commerce Clause to regulate anything having an
economic impact upon society-as does virtually every human activity. "[I]f we
were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any
activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate." 234
The immediate answer to these assertions is: So what? The relevant
constitutional term defining Congress' power is "commerce," as the Lopez
majority concedes. Likewise, the practical (as opposed to legal) definition of
"commerce" in a modem industrial society rationally includes all economic
231 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
232 Id. at 551.
233 Id. at 567-68.
234 Id. at 564.
20021 1665
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
activity, as the Court also implicitly concedes. 235 Therefore, the fact that the
macroeconomic fabric of the country is such that the legal meaning of
"commerce" has become broad enough to encompass virtually all human activity
should be viewed as simply a reflection of natural economic evolution. 236 The
reason the Court resists this conclusion about the broad reach of federal power is
attributable to the Court's introduction of a variable that is completely extraneous
to economic analysis (and for that matter, completely extraneous to an
interpretation of the Commerce Clause). That variable is state sovereignty. The
problem is that-as in Chief Justice Rehnquist's very similar majority opinion in
National League of Cities-the Chief Justice does little to identify either the
constitutional location or the precise contours of the state-sovereignty doctrine
being used to limit Congress's Commerce Clause authority. As in National
League of Cities, Chief Justice Rehnquist simply assumes that state sovereignty
exists. One of Chief Justice Rehnquist's few explicit references to the parameters
of this sovereignty also echoes his failed effort in National League of Cities by
referring to "areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States
historically have been sovereign." 237
The suggestion of a categorical allocation to the states of certain areas of
regulation was raised by Chief Justice Rehnquist once again in his majority
opinion in United States v. Morrison.238 In this case the Court struck down the
civil remedy provisions of the federal Violence Against Women Act, which
provided federal civil relief for victims of gender-motivated violence. As in
Lopez, the Court struck down this provision as an unconstitutional intrusion into
235 The Lopez majority does not dispute the factual basis of the contention by the
government-which is also the central theme of Justice Breyer's dissent in Lopez, 514 U.S. at
615--that gun violence around schools has a measurable economic effect. Rather, the majority
disputes the government's attempt to translate this real-world economic effect into a broad legal
definition of "commerce."
236 The Court's insistence on separating the economic effects of an activity from
"commerce" makes sense only if the Court is willing to go as far as Justice Thomas and argue
that the term "commerce" is limited to transactional activities-i.e., the actual buying and
selling of goods and services. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585-89 (Thomas, J., concurring). This
narrow, neoclassical definition of commerce was adopted by the Court during the latter part of
the nineteenth century. See, eg, United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); Kidd v.
Pearson, 128 U.S. I (1888). Also, this definition was used to frame many of the Court's most
notorious decisions striking down legislation during the New Deal. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935). The memory of the political ramifications these opinions had on the Court, coupled
with the economic flaws of the neoclassical worldview that generated this constricted view of
"commerce" probably explains the fact that no other Justice joined Justice Thomas' opinion
urging a return to this interpretation of the Commerce Clause. For a description and critique of
the development of the neoclassical views of the Commerce Clause, see Gey, supra note 38.
237 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
238 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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the sovereign powers of the states, despite the Court's acknowledgment that the
behavior in question had significant aggregate effects on the national economy.239
These economic effects were insufficient to permit Congress to regulate violent
criminal behavior under the Commerce Clause, the Court ruled, because the same
rationale could be applied to many other categories of "traditional state
regulation." 240 The other areas of "traditional state regulation" mentioned by the
Court in Morrison include "marriage, divorce, and childrearing."'241 The most
newsworthy aspect of language such as this is the interesting prospect that much
of the federal criminal code may be unconstitutional, but the more significant
theoretical point is that the Court seems to be returning to a National League of
Cities-style absolutist, zero-sum approach to identifying aspects of state and
national sovereignty. As the Court notes at one point in Morrison, "we can think
of no better example of the police power, which the Founders denied the National
Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and
vindication of its victims. '242
The problems this theory poses for the Court are obvious in light of the quick
demise of National League of Cities. As the Court discovered in trying to apply
its earlier traditional governmental functions analysis, it is not always easy to
determine which functions fit that description. Does the Court in Lopez and
Morrison really mean to suggest that the criminal law itself is exclusively the
province of states, except where the crime consists of major economic
transactions? If so, then the Court probably erred in its recent medical marijuana
ruling.243 In that case the Court upheld a federal statute that prevents the
distribution of controlled substances, including marijuana that is used for
medicinal purposes. But based on the Court's analysis in Lopez and Morrison,
that statute probably violates the inherent state authority to deal with such matters
on a local level.244 Likewise, does prosecution of a local robbery by the federal
239 Id. at 615-16.
240 Id. at 615.
241 Id. at 616. In a third case, the Supreme Court suggested in dicta that the states have
"traditional and primary power over land and water use." Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001).
242 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618.
243 See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001)
(upholding a federal injunction based on the Controlled Substances Act against nonprofit
groups distributing marijuana used for medical purposes).
244 The federal statute prohibits the distribution or manufacture of controlled substances,
so it could be argued that a commercial element is present. Aside from the fact that the
commercial nature of an inherent state activity should not (according to the Court's logic)
undermine the state's ability to exercise its inherent sovereign authority to deal with such
matters, the commercial element could easily be taken out of the case by projecting its
application to individuals who grow marijuana for their own use or who receive marijuana from
groups that do not charge for the substance. In these situations it would seem the federal statute
should not apply (again, according to the Court's logic in Lopez and Morrison), but the
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government depend on how much property is taken? Why would such an analysis
be relevant at all, assuming that the underlying activity itself-crime and
violence-is the matter of "traditional state regulation" that "the Founders denied
the National Government and reposed in the States"? 245 Economic effects should
be irrelevant if crime is, by its very nature, a noncommercial activity subject only
to the states' apparently exclusive police power. The effect a consistent
application of this doctrine would have on federal criminal regulation of drug
trafficking goes without saying.
The problem raised by these questions is that in the modem world neither
crime nor, for that matter, marriage, divorce, and childrearing are local affairs.
The total exclusion of the federal government from the regulation of crime and
other activities mentioned by the Court in Lopez and Morrison would render
many of these national problems insoluble. 246 Even the pre-1937 Court
recognized some national aspects to criminal behavior.247 There are, in fact,
indications that at least two members of the Lopez and Morrison majority have no
stomach for the chaos that would ensue if the Court followed its instincts and
granted states true-i.e., final and exclusive-sovereignty over entire categories
of social policy. In Lopez, Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, which was
joined by Justice O'Connor, in which he argued in favor of a "practical approach"
to the demarcation of federal and state power.248 Justice Kennedy specifically
eschews the sort of categorical approach that seems to be the central theme of
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinions in both Lopez and Morrison. One of
injunction upheld by the Court prohibited all distribution or manufacture of marijuana, without
reference to a commercial element of the transaction. See id. at 487 n. 1.
245 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615, 618.
246 The problem of recovering child support payments from noncustodial parents who flee
the jurisdiction of their child support obligations is one obvious example. See Child Support
Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228(a)(1) (2000), Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of
1998, 18 U.S.C. § 228(a)(3) (2000); see also United States v. Lewko, 269 F.3d 64 (1st Cir.
2001) (upholding both statutes against a Commerce Clause challenge based on Lopez and
Morrison); United States v. Faasse, 265 F.3d 475 (6th Cir. 2001) (same). Another example
would be federal regulation of pollution. See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 174 (interpreting
the federal Clean Water Act narrowly to avoid the "significant constitutional questions" posed
by the federal government's claim of jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats, which the Court
found "would result in a significant impingement of the States' traditional and primary power
over land and water use").
247 The earlier Court tended to limit its flexibility, however, to crimes that the Court
characterized as involving moral "pestilence." See Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188
U.S. 321, 356 (1903) (referring to the "pestilence of lotteries" and upholding federal regulation
of interstate trafficking in lottery tickets); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913)
(upholding federal regulation of interstate transportation of women and girls for immoral
purposes).
248 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 572 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(noting with favor several decisions in which the Court has adopted a "practical conception of
the commerce power").
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the lessons Justice Kennedy draws from the history of the Court's Commerce
Clause decisions is "the imprecision of content-based boundaries used without
more to define the limits of the Commerce Clause."
249
Justice Kennedy takes the Tenth Amendment cases following Garcia as the
model for his "practical approach" to the meaning of the Commerce Clause.
Indeed, he includes in his Lopez concurrence a long quotation from Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion in New York v. United States describing the
constitutional balance of federal and state power.250 Just as Chief Justice
Rehnquist's Commerce Clause opinions echo his categorical approach to the
Tenth Amendment, Justice Kennedy's "practical approach" to the Commerce
Clause echoes Justice Powell's effort in Garcia to articulate a flexible balancing
approach to the issue of state sovereignty.
Unfortunately, Justice Kennedy is no more successful than Justice Powell in
devising a clear demarcation between state and federal power under a
noncategorical approach. In the Commerce Clause area, as in the Tenth
Amendment cases, the central logical dilemma-which neither Justice Kennedy
nor Justice Powell answered satisfactorily-is how to grant states sovereign
power that exists only up to the point at which the federal government's interest is
strong enough to convince the Court to remove from the states the protective
cloak of sovereignty. For all his overtures to practicality and flexibility in such
determinations, Justice Kennedy eventually relies on the same categories as Chief
Justice Rehnquist. The central question in Justice Kennedy's analysis, as in Chief
Justice Rehnquist's, is "whether the exercise of national power seeks to intrude
upon an area of traditional state concern." 25 1 If so, then the attempt to exercise
national power under the Commerce Clause is unconstitutional, regardless of the
federal government's strong interest in the matter, and regardless of the fact that
(unlike the federal actions considered in the Tenth Amendment cases) the federal
action operates on private individuals and therefore does not directly affect the
states qua states at all.
As illustrated by Justice Kennedy ultimately resorting to a National League
of Cities-style approach of allocating sovereignty over certain "traditional" policy
matters to the states, the effort to devise a "practical" solution to the matter of
state sovereignty is probably futile. Efforts to use the concept of state sovereignty
to limit Congress' enumerated power under the Commerce Clause will either fail
for lack of coherent definitions of "traditional" functions or will evolve into a full-
fledged body of doctrine isolating important areas of national concern from
federal regulation. In this as in other areas of constitutional doctrine, states either
are sovereign or they are not. If Justice Kennedy and the other members of the
249 Id at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
250 Id at 574-75 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 157 (1992)).
251 Id at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Court's current majority are serious about granting the states real sovereignty,
they must abandon any effort to sugarcoat the effort and acknowledge the
consequences of removing power from the national government to address
national problems. The fact that the Justices are reluctant to do so explicitly and
without equivocation says a great deal about the wisdom of the path they have
chosen.
C. The Theoretical Rationales for State Sovereignty
The premise of this article is that the only coherent theory of sovereignty is
one that does not permit the sharing of "sovereign" powers by the state and
federal governments. One or the other government must be deemed sovereign;
not both. The preceding portions of this Part have attempted to bolster this
conclusion by providing several examples of the Court hedging its bets on
granting states true sovereignty, in ways that render theoretically inconsistent a
range of decisions in several major constitutional areas. A possible response to the
argument that the Court has produced an incoherent body of doctrine is that the
Court simply has not done a very good job of articulating what Justice Kennedy
calls the "practical approach" to the issue of state sovereignty. Perhaps it is
possible to provide a more precise rationale for this "practical" version of state
sovereignty than the Court has been able to muster, and thereby justify the sharing
of sovereign powers by states and the federal government.
The problem with this response is that the real difficulty with the concept of
state sovereignty goes much deeper than the simple inability of the Supreme
Court to determine how to articulate the balance it has struck between the state
and federal sovereign roles. Every plausible substantive rationale for granting
states sovereign power either can be achieved without granting states sovereignty
at all or, conversely, would require ascribing to the states absolute sovereignty
over certain policy matters of the sort described in Part III of this article-i.e.,
sovereignty that is exclusive, final, and enforceable against every other entity,
including the federal government. Under the substantive rationales usually offered
to justify state sovereignty, anything short of exclusive sovereignty (such as
Justice Powell's Garcia proposal to grant states an undefined and amorphous
half-sovereign power based on a balancing test of national and state interests) will
fail utterly to provide the benefits allegedly to be realized under a regime
governed by the comprehensive protection of states' rights.
A great deal of effort has been expended attempting to justify state
sovereignty within a system of judicially enforced federalism, but the primary
arguments in favor of such a system can be summed up in four basic assertions:
(1) sovereign states would be laboratories of experimentation capable of
developing new and beneficial social and political policies; (2) governance on the
state level would be more sensitive to local conditions and idiosyncrasies than
national governance; (3) the independent policy making authority provided by
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judicially protected state sovereignty would allow for ideological diversity among
the various regions of the country and thereby facilitate individual choice of
political affiliation and association; and (4) diversifying political power by
allocating specific authority to the states would prevent the accumulation of
power by the federal government, and therefore avoid federal government
tyranny.252 A review of these assertions reveals that they either do not require the
judicial protection of state sovereignty, or they require exclusive sovereignty of a
sort that none of the current Justices apparently want to endorse forthrightly.
With regard to the first assertion, for example, even if one assumes that the
laboratories-of-experimentation assertion is a valid description of the benefits of
state governance, the realization of those benefits does not require a system of
judicially protected state sovereignty. The basic thrust of the first rationale is that
independent states will foster a healthy competition to develop new social policies
that will ultimately benefit the entire nation. In Justice Brandeis' famous
formulation, "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. '253
Justice Kennedy echoes this sentiment in Lopez to justify limiting Congress'
power to impose criminal law solutions on social problems such as gun
violence. 254 One academic version of this argument modifies Justice Brandeis'
phrasing to emphasize that it is really the possibility of innovation, rather than
experimentation per se, that is the great benefit of federalism:
Countless state and local governments, remote from one another but facing
similar problems, develop numerous twists on solving them.... [G]overnments
learn of techniques employed elsewhere. The ones that seem sensible, that work,
survive; many other ideas die on the vine. This evolutionary process works best
precisely because many governments concoct ideas on their own .... 255
The factual premise of the assertion that states are likely to experiment is
open to question,2 56 but the more important point for the purposes of the present
252 For standard references containing different, but similar, renditions of these four
themes, see Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 386-405 (1997);
Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third
Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1988); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating
the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493-511 (reviewing Raoul Berger,
FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987)); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to
Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SuP. CT. REv. 341, 380-414.
253 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
254 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
255 Friedman, supra note 252, at 399-400.
256 Susan Rose-Ackerman's famous rejoinder to the "laboratory of experimentation"
argument notes that the political reality of risk-averse ambitious local politicians is such that
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discussion is that even if the laboratories-of-experimentation argument is correct,
judicial enforcement of state sovereignty will do little to increase the incidence of
beneficial sociopolitical experiments if those experiments can be exported easily
to other states. Local experiments will not cease under a system denying states
true sovereign power. Even if the federal government is recognized as the only
true sovereign, states will continue to exist and pursue individualized policies
until the federal government intervenes under one of its enumerated powers and
preempts further state action. Thus, if local experiments are beneficial generally to
citizens everywhere regardless of their geographic location, then other states will
recognize the benefits and adopt the same policies (thus creating a de facto
national system of regulation) or the federal government will adopt legislation
extending the policies nationwide through a system of nationally applicable laws.
To the extent that state sovereignty generates unique local policy experiments
that are not adopted by other states or the federal government, those experiments
are likely to be ones that benefit only one or a small number of similar states. If
those unique local laws do not harm neighboring states, the laws will result in a
net gain in overall well-being. But if those local experiments do harm to
neighboring states, then the laboratories-of-experimentation argument cannot be
viewed as a positive development. The laboratories-of-experimentation argument
succeeds as a justification for state sovereignty only if it increases the general
well-being of the entire country (since the alternative is an argument for
deleterious competition among the states for exclusive advantage over their
neighbors). If experiments in state "laboratories" will ultimately benefit only
some states (especially if these benefits come at the expense of other states), then
these experiments actually amount to invidious competition among states to the
detriment of the nation as a whole. This is precisely the sort of situation in which
the federal government should have the authority to represent the commonweal; it
is also precisely the sort of nationalistic action that would be prevented by a
system defined by true state sovereignty. In such situations the laboratories-of-
experimentation model actually provides an argument against state sovereignty,
not for it.257
radical experiments are unlikely to happen very often. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking
and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980).
257 The classic example would be child labor. In times of severe economic depression
some states may "experiment" with lowering the legal working age to allow children to work,
thereby reducing labor expenses for companies within that state (by increasing the pool of
available workers) and attracting scarce investment dollars to that state. Such an "experiment"
would not benefit the country as a whole (assuming there is a rough consensus that children
should not be allowed to work in factories at young ages) and would benefit the experimenting
state only by attracting investment away from other states with more rigorous work rules. This
is, of course, the "race to the bottom" argument that failed to convince the Supreme Court
during the pre-1937 era of state sovereignty, which constitutionalized laissez faire economics.
See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), in which the Court observes:
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The second argument in favor of state power-i.e., that governance on the
state level is more sensitive to local conditions than national governance-is
likewise not dependent on a regime of judicially enforced state sovereignty. In the
Court's formulation of this argument, federalism "assures a decentralized
government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous
society. '258 At some level theorists on both sides of the state-sovereignty debate
would agree with this statement. Even the strongest proponent of national power
is unlikely to oppose some condition-specific local policies. As the Supreme
Court has recognized in its dormant Commerce Clause decisions, local conditions
occasionally justify even discriminatory state legislation to protect certain natural
resources that could be destroyed or poisoned by the introduction of foreign
substances from other states. 259 Conversely, policies that attempt to isolate one
state from national economic problems, or from the general operation of the
national marketplace, are "virtually per se invalid. ' 260 In the commercial arena,
states may not even monopolize for the beneficial use of their own residents
natural resources located within their geographic boundaries. The Court has
"6consistently... held that the Commerce Clause... precludes a state from
mandating that its residents be given a preferred right of access, over out-of-state
consumers, to natural resources located within its borders or to the products
derived therefrom." 261
In its dormant Commerce Clause decisions, the Court draws a distinction
between local favoritism that is benign because it is absolutely necessary to
prevent a localized natural catastrophe and local favoritism that is invidious
because it is intended simply to leverage some natural advantage into a
commercial windfall for one state and its residents. The prohibition of "economic
Balkanization" 262 reflects a more general disfavor of state actions that have the
effect of undermining the national interest as a means of aggrandizing the
interests of a single state and its residents. A system of judicially enforced state
sovereignty would have little positive effect on benign state actions responding to
There is no power vested in Congress to require the states to exercise their police
power so as to prevent possible unfair competition. Many causes may co6perate to give
one State, by reason of local laws or conditions, an economic advantage over others. The
Commerce Clause was not intended to give to Congress a general authority to equalize
such conditions.
Id at 273.
258 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
259 See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (upholding the constitutionality of a
Maine statute prohibiting the importation into the state of nonnative baitfish, which could
potentially transmit parasites that were lethal to local species).
260 Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dept. of Envt'l Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
261 New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338 (1982).
262 See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979).
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legitimate problems created by local conditions because, if those conditions are
truly idiosyncratic and unrelated to the conditions in other states, there is little
cause for the federal government to forbid states from acting to resolve the local
problem and likewise little cause for other states to object. On the other hand, a
system of judicially enforced state sovereignty would have decidedly negative
effects on the national interest if it were used to protect states that act in self-
interested ways to favor their own residents at the expense of their neighbors.
263
263 One example of how the concept of state sovereignty is already used in this way is the
market participation exception to the normal dormant Commerce Clause rule prohibiting states
from discriminating against out-of-state economic actors. In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,
426 U.S. 794 (1976), the Court held that a state may discriminate against out-of-state residents
if the state participates in a particular economic market, rather than if the state simply regulates
that market. The Court reasoned that "[n]othing in the purposes animating the Commerce
Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market
and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others." Id at 810. Hughes was decided
the same day as National League of Cities, and although the Court did not expressly link the
two decisions, Hughes unmistakably echoes many of the same state-sovereignty themes
highlighted in National League of Cities. Four years later the Court acknowledged the linkage
between the market participation exception, the concept of state sovereignty, and National
League of Cities:
Considerations of sovereignty independently dictate that marketplace actions involving
"integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions"-such as the
employment of certain state workers-may not be subject even to congressional regulation
pursuant to the commerce power. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852
(1976). It follows easily that the intrinsic limits of the Commerce Clause do not prohibit
state marketplace conduct that falls within this sphere. Even where "integral operations"
are not implicated, States may fairly claim some measure of a sovereign interest in
retaining freedom to decide how, with whom, and for whose benefit to deal.
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438 n.10 (1980).
The Court's grandiose visions of state sovereignty are hard to reconcile with the
particularized and brazenly discriminatory effects of the state's action in Reeves. The case
involved a cement company that the state of South Dakota had owned for fifty years.
Traditionally, the company had sold cement to buyers both inside and outside the state. From
1970-1977, 40% of the plant's production had been sold to purchasers outside the state. The
plaintiff was a contractor from an adjoining state who had purchased cement from the South
Dakota plant for twenty years. The South Dakota plant provided him with 95% of his cement
needs. In 1978, a cement shortage developed in the region, and the South Dakota legislature
passed a law requiring the state's plant to sell to all South Dakota buyers before selling to any
out-of-state purchasers. As a result, the plaintiff had to reduce his business by 75% and lost
substantial business to South Dakota contractors who had a secure supply of cement. It is
difficult to reconcile the discrimination permitted in Reeves with the absolute rule against
discrimination in cases such as Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). In both cases
the states are using their governmental authority to warp the marketplace in a way that favors
one group of Americans to the direct harm of another group of Americans. But at least in
Reeves, the Court is not shy about acknowledging the true nature of the concept of state
sovereignty: "Such policies, while perhaps 'protectionist' in a loose sense, reflect the essential
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With regard to the second purported benefit of local political power, the concept
of judicially protected state sovereignty adds little to the states' authority to
pursue bona fide local interests; the concept is important only insofar as it would
protect self-interested state policies that have deleterious extraterritorial effects.264
The third and fourth arguments in favor of localized political power probably
do require a system governed by true state sovereignty. The third argument
asserts that state power will lead to the adoption of a range of different choices on
social and political policy, which in turn will facilitate individual choice by
providing a localized body of law more consistent with the desires of those living
in an area more geographically compact and socially homogeneous than the
nation as a whole. In Michael McConnell's description of this argument, granting
states the authority to make major policy decisions on a local level will offer a
greater proportion of citizens of the nation as a whole the ability to have their
preferred policy chosen by the relevant political jurisdiction.265 McConnell
reasons:
[A]ssume that there are only two states, with equal populations of 100 each.
Assume further that 70 percent of State A, and only 40 percent of State B, wish
to outlaw smoking in public buildings. The others are opposed. If the decision is
made on a national basis by a majority rule, 110 people will be pleased, and 90
displeased. If a separate decision is made by majorities in each state, 130 will be
pleased, and only 70 displeased.... In the absence of economies of scale in
government services, significant externalities, or compelling arguments from
justice, this is a powerful reason to prefer decentralized government. 266
and patently unobjectionable purpose of state government--to serve the citizens of the State."
Reeves, 447 U.S. at 442.
264 The distinctions between local governance in a system defined by state sovereignty
and local governance operating within a framework defined by a single national sovereign is
also the focal point of one of the best (and most vociferous) academic critiques of the Court's
states'-rights jurisprudence. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes
on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REv. 903 (1994). Professors Rubin and Feeley's central
thesis is that the benefits of decentralization have little or nothing to do with the concept of
states' rights. Rubin and Feeley argue that states' rights are largely about political symbolism
and the mythology of rural, small-town America. They view federalism as "a neurosis, a
dysfunctional belief to which we cling despite its irrelevance to present circumstances." Id at
950. Unfortunately, since Rubin and Feeley published their article the Court has gone out of its
way to make federalism increasingly relevant to present circumstances. It is no longer possible
to say, as Rubin and Feeley wrote in 1994, that the Supreme Court's
"enthusiasm for federalism seems inversely related to the significance of the issue at hand." Id.
at 949. It is also no longer possible to say that the Court "has remained silent, or granted its
approval, when significant national policies have displaced state authority." Id at 950.
Federalism may still be a neurosis, but now it is one that requires professional treatment.
265 McConnell, supra note 252, at 1494.
266 Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Likewise, McConnell argues, just as localized policymaking is likely to
produce a greater correlation between legal action and public policy preferences
of the local population, it is also less likely than a national policymaking process
to produce oppressive legislation. Specifically, McConnell asserts:
The main reason oppression at the federal level is more dangerous is that it is
more difficult to escape. If a single state chose, for example, to prohibit divorce,
couples seeking a divorce could move (or perhaps merely travel) to other states
where their desires can be fulfilled. Oppressive measures at the state level are
easier to avoid.... On the other hand, a nationwide rule-either voted by
Congress or adopted by the courts as a construction of the due process clause-
would have far more dramatic consequences. 267
It would be easy to propose rejoinders to these arguments. The notion that
popular majorities always get their way in state political processes may not
always be true, especially when those majorities come up against the concentrated
power of local economic interests (the tobacco lobby in states such as North
Carolina, for example). The dilution of locally powerful factions through the
nationalization of political authority was one of the primary rationales justifying
the transition from the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution, as Madison's
forceful argument in Federalist 10 exemplifies. 268 Moreover, the state in which a
person lives is often defined more by chance than by choice. Personal and
economic factors are probably more important in dictating an individual's choice
of a homestead than that individual's ideological compatibility with his or her
home state's political policies. It is not uncommon for individuals to move to (or
remain at) a particular place to be close to family, friends, or a job. It would be
267 Id. at 1503.
268 See THE FEDERALISTNO. 10, at 83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961):
The other point of difference is the greater number of citizens and extent of territory
which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government;
and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be
dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be
the distinct parties and interests, composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests,
the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number
of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are
placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the
sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable
that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other
citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to
discover their own strength and to act in unison with each other.... Hence, it clearly
appears that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy in controlling the
effects of faction is enjoyed by a large over a small republic-is enjoyed by the Union
over the States composing it.
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highly unusual for someone to move to New York simply because the state
typically votes Democratic.
In any event, even if the ideological diversity arguments in favor of local
political power are accurate, the important point for present purposes is that these
arguments require the states to be given real power over significant issues, and
also prohibits the national government from taking that power away. Thus, state
sovereignty-true state sovereignty, not the loose, indefinite variety proposed by
Justice Powell in Garcia-is an unavoidable mandate if one takes the ideological
diversity argument seriously. The same mandate of true state sovereignty arises
from the fourth argument in favor of localizing political power. As Steven
Calabresi summarizes the fourth argument:
Constitutionally mandated decentralization keeps government nearer the people,
where it can be watched more closely and where it is more likely to have good
information about popular preferences as to good policy. In economic terms,
monitoring, agency, and information costs all should be lower at the state level
because there is a closer identity of interests between state governments and the
governed than is possible at the national level, where government is inevitably
more remote from the citizenry. 269
This is viewed by many proponents of strong federalism (including the current
majority on the Supreme Court) as the most important argument because wide
dissemination of power to local governments serves to prevent the political
tyranny threatened by the accumulation of power in one national government.
"Perhaps the principal benefit of the federalist system is a check on abuses of
government power."270
As with the ideological diversity argument, the factual basis of the avoidance
of tyranny argument is questionable. The issue of whether a government is
"remote from the citizenry" involves much more than simple geography. The vast
differences in information available to the general public regarding federal and
state government action alone may undermine any sense that the federal
government is more "remote" than state government. Few states have the
equivalent of in-state versions of the New York Times, the national news
magazines, or television network news organizations to inform them about the
workings of their state government. Since few citizens physically travel to either
Washington, D.C. or their state capital to see their governments at work, the fact
that the state capital may require a shorter journey than the trip to Washington,
D.C. is far less significant than the fact that most citizens would have a more
difficult time naming their state representatives and senators than they would
naming the equivalent officeholders at the national level.
269 Steven G. Calabresi, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court: A Normative Defense, 574
ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 24, 27-28 (2001).
270 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
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Nevertheless, the significant factor here is that the prevention-of-tyranny
argument, like the ideological diversity argument, requires a system of state
governments in which the states are truly sovereign and can enforce that
sovereignty by judicial prohibition of federal encroachment. Without the authority
to enforce their sovereign interests through legal processes, the states' sovereign
powers would exist entirely at the whim of the federal government, which (as the
proponents of states' rights like to point out) will often find itself at odds with
officials in the states. "The realities of political life.., suggest that congressional
interests frequently clash with those of state and local governments.... In
general, the 'hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches [of
government] to exceed the outer limits of its power' will reduce any
congressional solicitude for state autonomy."271
The fact that the federal government has exempted state and local
governments from the operation of many federal regulations may belie this
statement,272 or at least indicate that there are a few leaks in the hydraulics of the
federal government power grab. Nevertheless, it is a political truism that any
entity that has power will seek to keep that power intact and increase it if
possible. 273 The same truism applies to the states, however, and more
271 Merritt, supra note 252, at 17 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)). For
a more comprehensive explanation of the reasons federal government officials are unlikely to
protect state-sovereignty interests, see Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and
Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752, 790-99
(1995). The reasons Calabresi enumerates include: (1) the nationalization of politics, (2) the
diminished role of state legislatures in controlling the process of sending representatives to
Congress, (3) the reduced influence of state political party machines and the growing influence
of national PACs and special interest groups, (4) the political incentives at the national level for
representatives to increase the amount of federal largess they can allocate to their districts, and
(5) the equally strong incentive for local political figures to grab as many federal government
resources as possible. What is striking about all these arguments is that none of them assert that
an increase in national government power will directly harm the local citizenry in a concrete
way; rather, the arguments assert that an increase in national government power will directly
harm the local governments and their officials by transferring power away from them. The
asserted harm to the local citizens is largely abstract in nature, in the sense that the citizens are
assumed to benefit from parochial governance, and are therefore presumptively harmed by any
exercise of national power that inhibits local politicians from pursuing their policy agendas.
272 Justice Blackmun collected several examples of these exemptions in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 553, 553 n.16 (1985). Following
Garcia, which involved the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state workers, the
states negotiated with Congress and received additional exemptions covering state and local
police and firefighters. See 29 U.S.C. § 204(f) (2000).
273 As Hobbes recognized, this is as much a psychological as a political phenomenon:
I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power
after power, that ceaseth onely in Death. And the cause of this, is not always that a man
hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be
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importantly, to state politicians. The politicians are important because the real
antagonists in battles over federalism are not philosophical abstractions labeled
"state government" and "the federal government." The conflicts described in the
federalism literature between federal and state governments are really conflicts
between the ambitious politicians and bureaucrats who run the federal and state
governments.
There is little to distinguish between the mindsets of local and national
politicians. The righteous, self-consciously populist tone of many proposals to
empower the states is seriously misplaced; the ongoing struggle for power
between the federal and state governments is not a fight between rapacious, self-
interested national politicians and passive, public-spirited local politicians. Both
antagonists are, in the end, seeking to boost their own political fortunes by
satisfying their very different constituencies. Ironically, the arguments used by
proponents of states' rights-i.e., that national politicians are divorced from their
state roots and, therefore, cannot be counted upon to defend local interests-
highlight the insurmountable problem with states rights, which is that parochial
interests are the root of the movement for states' rights, and these parochial
interests very often are incompatible with the national interest. Just as the national
government and its politicians cannot be expected to give undue deference to the
wishes of narrow local concerns, the states and their politicians cannot be
expected to defer to any national policy that conflicts sharply with their own
insular self-interest. Alexander Hamilton recognized this underlying political
reality of state sovereignty long ago when he noted:
[T]here is in the nature of sovereign power an impatience of control that disposes
those who are invested with the exercise of it to look with an evil eye upon all
external attempts to restrain or direct its operations. From this spirit it happens
that in every political association which is formed upon the principle of uniting in
a common interest a number of lesser sovereignties, there will be found a kind of
eccentric tendency in the subordinate or inferior orbs by the operation of which
there will be a perpetual effort in each to fly off from the common center. This
tendency is not difficult to be accounted for. It has its origin in the love of power.
Power controlled or abridged is almost always the rival and enemy of that power
by which it is controlled or abridged. This simple proposition will teach us how
little reason there is to expect that the persons intrusted with the administration of
the affairs of the particular members of a confederacy will at all times be ready
with perfect good humor and an unbiased regard to the public weal to execute the
resolutions or decrees of the general authority. The reverse of this results from
the constitution of man.274
content with a moderate power; but because he cannot assure the power and means to live
well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.
HOBBES, supra note 88, at 49-50.
274 THE FEDERALISTNO. 15, at 111 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961).
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If, in the end, localism is as valued as the principles of equal protection, free
speech, and religious freedom in the American constitutional scheme, then the
proponents of localism have an obligation to acknowledge the consequences of
this position. It is not possible to argue consistently in favor of strong
constitutional protection of local governmental authority and at the same time
deny the unsettling consequences of state sovereignty. 275 If we are to have
judicial enforcement of federalist values, then we must have some form of state
sovereignty, and if we are to have state sovereignty, then some form of a National
League of Cities-style demarcation of state and federal influence is necessary.
Once the realm of the sovereign states is defined precisely, the federal
government must be rendered powerless to intrude into the sovereign states'
prerogatives, no matter how great the national interest.
This is where the logic of state sovereignty leads. The fact that the courts thus
far have refused to follow that logic to its ultimate (and probably disastrous)
conclusion means that, despite the many references to the concept in the Court's
recent opinions, even the current majority on the Court is hesitant about the
possible ramifications of their theory. But in the absence of a whole-hearted
embrace of state sovereignty, the Justices' existing partial defense of states' rights
275 For one of the more interesting attempts to salvage judicial protection of states' rights
while renouncing the concept of state sovereignty, see Rapaczynski, supra note 252.
Rapaczynski relies on a definition of sovereignty similar to that set forth in Part Ill of this
article. See id. at 347-48 (asserting that sovereignty entails: (1) the control of particular subjects
and a particular domain, (2) the ability to issue legally valid, enforceable dictates, and (3) the
final authority over relevant subject matters). When defined in this way, Rapaczynski notes that
the concept of state sovereignty is largely incompatible with the purposes and operation of the
Constitution. "The very recognition of the existence of the American nation and the creation of
the United States as the expression of its political will mean that the Framers recognized the
degree of interdependence among the states that made thinking of them in terms of sovereignty
largely inappropriate." Id. at 353-54. Having rejected the concept of state sovereignty,
however, Rapaczynski then proposes that the courts devise a functional analysis of federalism,
which would then be used to restrict federal government activity interfering with certain central
aspects of state activity. This functional analysis is drawn from many of the same rationales
justifying state sovereignty discussed in this Part. Rapaczynski argues that two of these
traditional rationales--"tyranny prevention and the provision of a space for participatory
politics"--should be the basis for this new "functional" protection of the states. Id at 414. The
problems with using these rationales to protect state activity have been discussed above. See
supra notes 231-51 and accompanying text. These problems doom Rapaczynski's attempt to
salvage some system of judicially protected states' rights because no matter how that system is
repackaged, it still amounts to a system of state sovereignty. Even if the problems of defining
and applying these principles could be surmounted (which even Rapaczynski acknowledges
would be difficult), the courts would in effect be carving out a particular set of policies in which
regulation would be allocated to states and denied to the federal government. Using
Rapaczynski's terminology, the states would be provided a domain, final authority over policies
enacted within that domain, and legal enforceability of the policies against the federal
government and others. In other words, the states would be given sovereignty of a sort that
Rapaczynski himself recognizes is incompatible with the American constitutional scheme.
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is robbed of any substantive justification. The good news is that the powers the
Court has conferred on the states in recent Tenth Amendment, Eleventh
Amendment, Commerce Clause, and abstention decisions should be easy to
overturn once some future Court thinks about these matters carefully and dispels
once again the myth of state sovereignty.
V. CONCLUSION
It might be true, as Justice Holmes famously suggested, that the "life of the
law" is experience, not logic. 276 But a little logic now and then is still a good
thing. The logic of state sovereignty is unmistakable. If states are not sovereign,
then there is no logical reason that the federal government should be prohibited
from exercising fully its enumerated powers, even if the exercise of those powers
interferes with the operations or policies adopted by certain states. If states are
sovereign, on the other hand, then the Court has been far too accommodating of
federal government policies that intrude into state prerogatives. These two options
are mutually exclusive; the Court cannot continue to try having it both ways by
denying states true sovereignty-i.e., exclusive, final, and enforceable power over
matters within clearly defined sovereign domains-while simultaneously granting
states the authority to fend off unwanted federal encroachments under ambiguous
rules that defy clear explanation and sometimes (see, for example, the morass of
Eleventh Amendment law) common sense.
There would be little downside to an outright recognition that states lost their
sovereignty with the adoption of the Constitution. States operating within a
federal system defined by a single national sovereign would not be able to use the
courts to thwart unwanted federal policies, but neither would the states go out of
existence or lose effective control over policy matters that are truly local in nature.
The parochial and mundane nature of most local issues insulates the states from
federal interference for the simple reason that there is little to merit the attention
of ambitious politicians who populate the policymaking institutions of the
national government. Grabbing control over issues that general consensus dictates
are largely local in nature is not the way to advance a national political career.
In contrast, granting states true sovereignty would finally require the courts to
define the parameters of that sovereignty-a task the Court so badly bungled in
National League of Cities that even those who defended the general theory of
National League (see Justice Powell's dissent in Garcia, for example) sheepishly
gave up the effort to defend that decision's actual holding. The only thing worse
than a situation defined by the open-ended quasi-sovereignty advanced by the
likes of Justice Powell would be a situation in which the Court actually did define
the specific boundaries of the new state sovereigns, which would then be the
catalyst for a Yugoslavian-style battle among parochial sovereign entities that
276 See OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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have the same primary objective as every other true sovereign: i.e., dominance of
neighboring sovereigns. Why embracing the myth of state sovereignty makes
sense as political theory in the modem age is a question that the Court has not yet
answered, nor, in its haste to evade acknowledging the extreme implications of its
actions, even seen fit to address.
